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Injury for Standing Purposes When
Constitutional Rights are Violated:
Common Law Public Value
Adjudication at Work
By

WILLIAM BURNHAM*

Introduction
For the past ten years, Article III standing in the federal courts has
required the litigant to show that he or she has suffered or is threatened
with "distinct and palpable" injury, that the respondent's actions caused
the injury, and that the relief requested will redress the injury.' As these
requirements suggest, the keystone of standing is injury. Without injury,
there is no need to proceed with the analysis. Furthermore, the definition of injury radically affects application of the causation and redressability requirements.2
Injury analysis begins with the identification of the litigant's interests, the invasion or impairment of which results in cognizable injury.3
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., B.S., 1968,

J.D. 1973, Indiana University (Bloomington).
1. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 3531.4-3531.6 (2d ed. 1984). The existence of three separate and distinct
standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability has not always been clear from
the Court's summary statements about standing. The Court has sometimes described causation and redressability as the same thing. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) has sometimes mentioned only redressability in summarizing
the requirements, id. at 79, and Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100
(1979); has sometimes mentioned only causation in summarizing, Gladstone Realtors, 441
U.S. at 99; and has sometimes spoken as if causation and redressability were two separate
requirements. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976)
and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). In recent cases, however, there has been a greater tendency to distill
out three distinct requirements, see, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-40 (1984);
Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 93-113. See also Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72
CAL. L. REV. 68, 79-82 (1984).
3. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976) (quoting
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734 (1972). See also C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER, supra note 1, at § 3531.4;
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The determination of whether the litigant has suffered injury requires an
evaluation of whether the impaired interest deserves protection against
injury.4 Presently, there are two approved sources of a litigant's legally
cognizable interests: the courts and Congress.
The courts' contribution is embodied in what I shall call the "common law public value interest" model of injury analysis.' Professor Vining has described this process as a search for interests shared by society
that are imbued with a "public value." 6 Some of these interests are tangible economic ones, but they need not be. Their ultimate source, however,
is a perceived social value system rather than a legal one. The "common
law" label attaches because it is the courts that determine whether the
invasion of a particular interest can be stated in terms of a public value
and, hence, whether it constitutes injury.
Congress contributes to the creation of cognizable interests by way
of statutes, in accordance with what I shall call a "statutory legal interest" model of injury.7 Congress has virtually unfettered legislative power
to "create legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing even
though no injury would exist without the statute."8 Thus, if a litigant
alleges that his or her statutory rights are violated, that allegation is sufficient to show injury.
Having legitimized a legal interest model of injury analysis for statutory rights, the Court could easily apply that model to rights secured by
the Constitution. However, the Court has steadfastly refused to do so.
Of the numerous anomalies in the current law of standing,9 perhaps the
most puzzling is the Court's refusal to acknowledge the Constitution as a
proper source of legal rights, the invasion of which constitutes injury for
standing purposes. As early as United States v. Richardson,0 and as reBurnham, Aspirationaland Existential Interests of Social Reform Organizations: A New Role
for the IdeologicalPlaintiff,20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 153, 185 n. 116 (1985).
4. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER supra note 1, § 3531.4, at 420; Davis, The
LiberalizedLaw of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 468 (1970).
5. See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
6. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 61 (1978).
7. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
8. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).

9. It is difficult to find commentary on standing that is not critical. Recent taxonomies
of doctrinal anomalies include K. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 24:1-:36 (2d

ed. 1983); Nichol, supra note 2; Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985). See also Doemberg, "We the People" John Locke, Collective
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52

(1985); Fallon, Of Justiciability,Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984). For other critical commentary and citations to
the only two articles with positive views, see Nichol, supra note 2, at 68 n.3.

10. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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cently as Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Ina, II and Allen v. Wright, 2 the Court has
emphasized that "an 'injury' consisting solely of an alleged violation of a
'personal constitutional right'" does not alone constitute injury for
3
standing purposes.1
However one might criticize this state of affairs, there are indications that the Court does find injury in cases alleging violations of constitutional rights where no other injury is evident. This has occurred in
primarily four areas: equal protection, 4 procedural due process, 1 5 vot17
ing rights,' 6 and religious freedom.
Some commentators consider these apparent departures from standing doctrine as evidence of the Court's cynical willingness to abandon the
injury principle when attracted to the merits of a particular case or category of cases.'" Others more charitably have acknowledged the departures as sui generis or as responses to overriding policy considerations
that play a legitimate role in shaping standing results, if not standing
doctrine.' 9 The problem with these explanations is that the Court has
never provided a doctrinal basis for them. The Court shows every indication that it intends to stick to the standing doctrine it has articulated
and that it expects the doctrine to be applied in a principled way in deciding standing questions.
This Article's purpose is to set out a principled explanation for the
Court's apparently inconsistent behavior. While I believe that the statutory legal interest model of injury analysis cannot be applied to support a
finding of injury in constitutional rights cases, I believe that the Court
has properly applied and should continue to apply the common law public value model to find intangible noneconomic injury when certain constitutional violations are alleged.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the two
models of injury analysis previously mentioned. Part II explores the
Court's rejection of the legal interest model as applied to constitutional
guarantees, and the Court's persistence, despite that rejection, in finding
injury in the four constitutional areas mentioned above. In Part III, I
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

454 U.S. 464 (1982).
104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489 n.26. See infra notes 73-92A.
See infra notes 93-110, 142-154 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-112, 155-164 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-119, 167-179 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 120-134, 180-198 and accompanying text.
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
Id.
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argue that a principled basis for the Court finding injury in these and
perhaps other constitutional rights violation cases is found in the common law public value model, and I discuss the circumstances under
which litigants suffer "personal" injury in such cases. Part IV considers
how the Court has failed to recognize that it engages in common law
public value adjudication. I suggest how the Court might better approach that task in order to bring clarity and certainty to the standing
doctrine and address possible objections to the common law public value
adjudication process.
I.

The Nature of Injury in Fact and the Two Models of Injury
Analysis

A. The Common Law Public Value Interest Model
Injury in fact became part of standing doctrine vocabulary in Data
ProcessingService v. Camp.2 0 Before Camp, standing could exist only if
injury to a "legal interest" was shown.2 1 Litigants suing the government
were required to show that the interest injured was secured by the common law (or, more accurately, by analogy to the common law when the
government was the opposing party), by statute, or by the Constitution.22
Because this requirement of "legal injury" often bore an unsettling resemblance to the parties' claim on the merits,2 3 Camp established that
the relevant injury was not the invasion of legal interests, but injury in
fact-that is, an injury that is real and concrete and accepted as such
without the need to find that the law protects against it.24 Thus, in
Camp, the plaintiffs' demonstration that they were losing business to
banks was sufficient to show injury, regardless of whether they could
claim a common law, statutory, or constitutional protection from injury
20. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In Camp, data processing businesses challenged a federal banking regulation that would have permitted banks to provide data processing services in competition with plaintiffs' businesses, allegedly in violation of a federal statute prohibiting banks from
engaging in any activity other than banking services.
21. Id. at 153. See also infra notes 22 and 25.
22. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge govemmental action of
a sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the
courts.... Or standing may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or a statute.")
(citation omitted).
23. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153 ("The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits."). But see Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (criticizing
Camp's additional requirement that injury be within the "zone of interests" created by the
statute sued under as suffering from the same defect).
24. Camp, 397 U.S. at 152.
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to competitor interests.2 - Though economic injury was involved in
Camp, the Court nonetheless opined that injury in fact is not limited to
economic interests, but may reflect injuries to noneconomic values as
well.26
The post-Camp litigant no longer need show that the interest allegedly injured is legally secured in the sense of being protected by positive
law. Instead, it is sufficient that the interest exists in a non-legal value
system shared by society.27 It is the province of courts, and the Supreme
Court in particular, to determine which injured interests represent public
25. The principal case relied upon by the court of appeals in Camp was Tennessee Elec.
Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939). According to T. V.A., "legal rights" include property or contract rights, protection from tortious invasion of privileges granted by statute. Id. at
137-38. In T. VA., private power companies sought to enjoin government development of
power on due process grounds, asserting that such development competed with their businesses, thereby causing economic loss. Id. at 138. The Court rejected this injury as not invading any legal right, because the common law does not protect a person against the
consequences of competition. Id. at 139. By contrast, in Frost v. Corporation Comm., 278
U.S. 515 (1929), the Court found legal injury to competitor interests where the competitor
plaintiff was engaged in a regulated industry. The Court held that injury to competitor interests is legal injury where state law provides that the right to engage in the regulated industry is
not a license, but a franchise. Id. at 519-20.
26. 397 U.S. at 154. See infra text at note 29. This statement has been borne out by
subsequent history. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
27. See J. VINING, supra note 6, at 61. In Professor Vining's terms, courts will acknowledge an invaded interest as a cognizable injury in fact if "the effect complained of can be cast in
terms of public values." According to Vining, the courts will recognize invasion of an interest
as harm only if the interest is a "trait and motive of behavior widely enough shared to permit
us to recognize it as a social role." Id. By contrast, invasion of private interests-interests
which are idiosyncratic or not widely shared or understood-will not be seen by courts as
cognizable injury.
The process by which private values become public values is not entirely clear. With a
hypothetical, Vining illustrates the process involved when a litigant presents a novel claim:
Suppose a landscape predominantly blue-water, distant hills, houses. An authority
decides to build a red building. There may be all manner of legal defects in the decision to build: lack of a necessary hearing, excessive height, noncompliance with sewage regulations. An individual comes in to challenge and when asked in what
capacity he is appearing, what his interests are, replies that he loves scenes that are
entirely blue, and that the decision to build red would make it more difficult for him
to realize his hopes. Would a court proceed to the merits, no matter how much he
cried out? I think not. The court would say, "You are not harmed .... ." There may
be every reliable evidence of hurt and willingness to argue the merits with every
resource: tears, investment of money in the litigation, a longpast history of interest in
all-blue. What prevents the court from seeing harm is the absence, in the court's
eyes, of a "you" to be harmed; and what prevents the court from seeing a "you," a
person, is the absence of any public value to define a class for which the individual
voice might speak. To say "I am an all-blue lover, That is my identity, that is who 'r
am, that is 'who' is speaking here before the court" does not have meaning until the
love of all-blue (as opposed to a love of a balance of colors including blue) becomes a
trait and motive of behavior widely enough shared to permit us to recognize it as a
social role.
Id. at 61. For an application of Vining's theory to the interests of social reform organizations
as a means of explaining direct standing for such groups, see Burnham, supra note 3, at 200-08.
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values worthy of redress. This is usually done on a case-by-case basis,
though the Court has occasionally set forth in dictum categories of interests which it sees as imbued with a public value. Because the courts are
the source of this category of injured interests, finding that certain interests represent "public values" without any28immediate textual aids, I label

this group "common law" injury in fact.

The development of environmental and aesthetic interests as protected public values provides an example of this process. In Camp, the
Court recognized in dictum that the interests alleged to be injured "may
reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic
values." 29 Two years later, in Sierra Club v. Morton,30 the plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the challenged commercial development of na-

tional park land "would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would
impair the enjoyment of the park for future generations. '31 The Court

stated that it "[did] not question that this type of harm may amount to
an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing" and that the
complaint therefore alleged "injury to a cognizable interest."' 32 The only
support offered for this conclusion was the observation that "[a]esthetic
and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life in our society."' 33 This common sense
conclusionary observation about the public value status of environmental
and aesthetic interests has not been improved upon. A year later, in
United States v. SCRAP, 34 the Court relied upon Sierra Club to find in28. See infra note 64. As indicated infra notes 286-300 and accompanying text, common
law public value adjudication shares other qualities with other species of common law
adjudication.
29. 397 U.S. at 154.
30. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
31. Id. at 734.
32. Id. at 39-55. The Court, however, proceeded to deny standing to the Club because,
although there was "injury to a cognizable interest," the Club's members were not "among the
injured" since the Club had failed to allege that its members used the parkland in question. Id.
at 735. Rather, the Club relied on its members' interest and expertise in environmental degradation. The Court labeled this relationship to the admittedly cognizable interest in the degradation that might occur a "mere 'interest in the problem.'" Id at 739. See infra notes 218256 and accompanying text (addressing when a particular litigant's relationship to an invaded
cognizable interest is sufficiently close that he can be said to be personally affected by an invasion of that interest). The Court's rejection of the Club's allegation that its members, based on
their interest and expertise, represented the cognizable interest involved is criticized in J. VINING, supra note 6, at 158 n.*. An argument favoring direct standing for the Club based on a
different set of interests is developed in Burnham, supra note 3, at 194-96, 203-04.
33. 405 U.S. at 734.
34. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). The public value underpinnings of SCRAP are discussed in J.
VINING, supra note 6, at 175.
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jury caused by the possibility of more littering in Washington, D.C.
parks. Five years later, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group,35 the Court simply relied upon SCRAP and Sierra Club to
find that "the environmental and aesthetic consequences of the thermal
pollution of the two lakes in the vicinity of the disputed [nuclear] power
plants is the type of harmful effect which has been deemed adequate in
prior cases to satisfy the 'injury in fact' standard." 3 6
It is undoubtedly true that there was a time "when the courts would
have called a plaintiff claiming harm because of the acidification of a
stream in a nearby national forest an interloper asserting no injury whatsoever.""7 However, that is probably untrue today. Something has
clearly changed, and that change has been a social change, not a legal
one. No statute is cited to support the Sierra Club observation, which
forms the only basis for finding the interests cognizable. Moreover, the
very language chosen to describe the standard employed in that statement-whether the proffered interests "are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society" 3 8 -bespeaks a social hierarchy of values,
not a legal one.
An example of an interest that was not perceived by the Court as a
public value is the interest claimed by the Does in Roe v. Wade.3 9 The
Does were a childless married couple and the wife was not pregnant.
The couple claimed Texas' criminal prohibition of abortion caused injury
to their "marital happiness."'
The Court called the alleged injury
"speculative," involving a "possible future contraceptive failure, possible
future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and
possible future impairment of health.""a Though admitting that "these
possibilities might have some real or imagined impact on [the Does']
marital happiness, ' no sufficient injury in fact was found. Professor
Vining comments:
[R]unning out this chain of consequences was irrelevant, because the consequence at the end was not the injury the Does had
in mind. The Does represented sexual play, for which "marital
happiness" was a euphemism, and a desire and capacity for sexual
play might be "immediately" and "palpably" affected by a mere
possibility that an abortion might be necessary and unavailable,
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Id. at 73-74.
Nichol, supra note 2, at 89.
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id.
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just as "safety" in a gasoline storage area is "palpably" affected by
the mere possibility of fire from lighted cigarets. The court simply
did not recognize or was not brought to focus upon sexual play as a
[public] value.4 3

B.

The Statutory Legal Interest Model

The other category of injured interests comprising the current law of
standing has its source in congressional action. As indicated earlier,
Congress has the power to create by statute "legal rights the invasion of
which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the

statute."'

The Court has accepted as injury the impairment of interests

which exist solely by virtue of these statutory rights. For example, in
Havens Realty v. Coleman,4 5 the defendant realtor misrepresented the
availability of apartments to a black housing discrimination tester-a
person with no desire to rent an apartment but who contacted realtors
solely to gather evidence of violations of housing discrimination laws.

The misrepresentation constituted injury, according to the Court, because the realtor's action violated the tester's congressionally secured
46
"legal right to truthful information about available housing."
43. J. VINING, supra note 6, at 175. Deciding questions of injury based upon a social
value system rather than a legal one raises important questions of methodology, legitimacy,
and relative institutional competence. See infra Part IV for a discussion of some of these
issues.
44. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). See also Havens Realty v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41
n.22 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
45. 455 U.S. 373 (1982).
46. Id. at 374 (relying on the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, particularly § 3604(a)). In Linda R.S., the Court juxtaposed a statement regarding Congress' power
to create standing through the creation of new legal rights with the truism that "Congress may
not confer jurisdiction on Article III federal courts to render advisory opinions." 410 U.S. at
617 n.3 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972)). See also Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). In addition, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), plaintiffs argued that
they had standing under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court remarked that
"[n]either the Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional enactment, can
lower the threshold requirements of standing under Art. III." Id. at 487 n.24.
Clearly, the Court reserves the power to say when Congress has gone too far. The observation, however, that the injury occasioned by invasion of a new right is cognizable "even
though no injury would exist without the statute" shows that Congress can go beyond common law public values defined by the Court. Cf.id.("Respondents do not argue that the
Administrative Procedure Act creates a legal right 'the invasion of which creates standing.' ").
How far Congress may go remains to be seen, since the Court has never held unconstitutional
any standing granted by Congress.
Professor Nichol argues that under the legal rights device, "Congress could most likely
create rights of the most ethereal sort, for example, rights to honest government, an efficient
bureaucracy, or an integrated society, and grant standing to 'any person' to enforce them."
Nichol, supra note 2, at 84. On the other hand, Nichol argues that Muskrat, "if still good law,
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The Court's statement that there is injury "even though no injury
would exist without the statute,"'4 7 makes it clear that legal interests established by congressional action exist independently from the social
value system involved in common law public value injury analysis. The
statement indicates that an interest chosen for protection by Congress
might not exist in any shared social value system. Using the tester in
Havens Realty as an example, it is doubtful whether, absent statutory
protection, merely being lied to would constitute injury. Personal feelings of outrage over lies are a part of everyday existence with which we

the "distinct and palpable" injury
must all live, and would not constitute
48

sufficient to support standing.
The legal rights or interests secured by statute not only may be intangible, as demonstrated by the tester's injury in Havens Realty, but
they may be diffuse and generalized. Under the concept of neighborhood
standing, for example, the Fair Housing Act was construed in Havens
Realty and two other cases4 9 as securing an interest in "the social and

professional benefits of living in an integrated society""0 and "an actionable right to be free from the adverse consequences.., of racially discrim51
inatory practices directed at and immediately harmful to others." 53
2 a village,
Based on this injury, residents of an apartment complex,
and a large metropolitan area54 were granted standing conditional upon
their proving the requisite causal link between the alleged injury and the

challenged conduct.

5

indicates that Congress cannot decide the 'adverseness of the parties prospectively; such determinations must be left to the courts.'" Id. at 91-92.
47. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
48. A strong case could be made that such activity constitutes injury without the assistance of the Fair Housing Act. See Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1484-86 (11th
Cir. 1985) (relying on Havens Realty to hold that testers have standing to prosecute a case
against racial steerers under 42 U.S.C. § 1982). Cf Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1985)
(tester bus rider threatened with arrest has standing). But see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (though neighborhood standing is available for plaintiffs making out a Fair Housing
Act claim, it is not available for those suing only under general civil rights statutes).
49. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111-14 (1979); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1972).
50. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 376 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. at 91, 111 (1979)).
51. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 513 (1975) (explaining Trafficante).
52. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10.
53. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 112-14.
54. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 377-78.
55. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 114; Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 377-78. The fact that the interest created by the statute is diffuse or general should be distinguished from general federal
statutes that provide nothing more than a cause of action for violations of rights secured by
other statutes or the Constitution. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1984) (providing a cause of
action for violations of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
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The Court's handling of the statutory neighborhood standing injury
also emphasizes the distinction between common law public value injury
analysis and the statutory legal interest analysis. Acceptance of neighborhood injury in the Fair Housing Act cases stands in stark contrast to
Warth v. Seldin.5 6 In Warth, the plaintiffs could not bring their case
within the scope of the Act and thus were limited to arguing injury in
accordance with the common law public value model. Applying that
model, the Court in Warth found that the alleged interest in the "benefits
of living in an integrated community" 5 7 did not exist apart from the provisions of the Fair Housing Act and thus could not form any basis for
injury to the plaintiffs. 8 The Court thus implicitly held that the neighborhood interest does not exist in the common law public value system,
though it does exist in the statutory legal system for those to whom the
statute applies.
The independence of statutory legal interests from public value interests shows why, despite the clarity of the legal interest model as applied in Havens Realty, there are not a great many instances in which the
model is explicitly relied upon to find injury. In a case where the interest
at stake is sanctioned by both value systems, there is no need to rely on
the statutory violation to find injury. For example, had the tester in
Havens Realty been a bona fide apartment seeker who failed to obtain an
apartment because of the realtor's misrepresentations, the loss of that
tangible benefit would have supplied the injury for standing purposes. A
consideration of whether a violation of a statutory "right to truthful information about housing" constituted injury would have been unnecessary. Although there is no established preference for tangible over
laws" of the United States); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1983) ("A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."). Such
statutes add nothing to the injury analysis, and injury determinations are made either by reference to common law public values or legal interests secured by another statute. See Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S.
464, 487 n.24 (1982) (implying that the Administrative Procedure Act does not create a legal
right, the invasion of which would create standing).
56. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
57. Id. at 512.
58. Id. at 512-13. Plaintiffs in Warth sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983. Id
at 493. Although the Court's treatment of any section 1983 claim is consistent with the legal
interest model, see supra note 55, the Court could be criticized for not considering carefully
whether sections 1981 and 1982 secured statutory legal rights. Cf Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (Sections 1981 and 1982 "prohibit all racial discrimination,
whether or not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein."). In addition, in view of the "cross-pollination" that takes place between statutory policy and public
values, see infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text, arguably the Warth Court took a rather
narrow view of the impact of the national policies embodied in the Fair Housing Act.
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intangible interests,59 courts are likely to search for the familiar before
exploring the unknown. Further, lower courts may be slow to accept the
Court's statements that a statutory violation vel non may constitute injury, since that implies that part of the "legal injury" test discredited in
Camp has crept back into standing law.6"
Consequently, reliance on an alleged violation of a statutory right as
injury usually will occur when the plaintiff cannot rely on tangible public
value interests. This would arise in two situations: First, when the tangible public value interest cannot be identified, for example the situation
represented by the tester in Havens Realty; and second, when a tangible
interest can be identified, but the injury to that interest is ineligible for
consideration as a predicate for standing because it fails to pass the other
standing requirements of causation or redressability. An example of the
latter category are cases involving procedural rights secured by statutes
or regulations. In such cases, the plaintiff may have tangible interests
that were adversely affected by the administrative action taken. But if
the plaintiff argues that the action was wrong because the agency failed
to follow correct procedures, relief compelling the agency to follow correct procedures to redetermine the plaintiff's rights may result in the
same agency decision. In effect, although the plaintiff can show he was
injured by the agency action, he cannot show that the relief requested
would redress that injury.
61
National ConservativePoliticalAction Committee v. FEC
illustrates
the problem. The plaintiffs challenged the legality of an FEC advisory
opinion permitting the Democratic National Committee to solicit funds
to pay off pre-1975 campaign debts, without applying the 1976 limitations on individual contributions. The plaintiffs claimed they had been
denied the opportunity to comment on the proposed advisory opinion.
In sustaining standing, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held:
The Act and the Commission's own regulations provide that interested persons must be given an opportunity to comment upon the
Commission's proposed advisory opinions. A plaintiff need only allege that it was denied that opportunity and that, had the opportunity been made available, it would have commented upon the
59. Cf Camp, 397 U.S. at 153-54 (standing may stem from non-economic values as well
as economic ones).
60. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. See also Nichol, supra note 2, at 83
(observing that "the analysis of statutorily... based standing claims has been hampered by the
relatively recent adoption of the injury-in-fact standard as an overriding standing requirement," but arguing that "[n]othing in the historical progression of standing analysis... should
indicate that the concrete injury [in fact] requirement should limit plaintiffs seeking to protect
statutory or constitutionally based interests").
61. 626 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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opinion. Because appellants' complaint contains both allegations,
they have62standing to challenge the advisory opinion on procedural
grounds.

Since injury to the procedural right to comment was found, there was no
need to determine that any comments the plaintiff would have made
would have been likely to affect the content of the advisory opinion.6 3
62. Id. at 957-58.
63. Id. Watt v. Energy Action Edue. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981), evidences a parallel
analysis. Watt involved the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.,
which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to lease tracts of the outer continental shelf
(OCS) for mineral development. The 1978 amendments to the Act required the federal government to turn over a fair share of the revenues from OCS leases to the neighboring coastal
state whenever the federal government and the state own adjoining portions of an OCS oil and
gas pool. The 1978 amendments also required the Secretary to experiment with different lease
bidding systems to see which would assure receipt of a fair market value for the lands leased.
However, the Secretary did not engage in any such experimentation. California, which owned
a number of OCS tracts adjoining federal land, sued to compel experimentation. Congress
provided in the 1978 amendments that standing was extended to those having "a valid legal
interest." At first, the Court simply stated that California had standing because of its direct
financial stake: because California alleged that "the bidding systems currently used ... are
incapable of producing a fair market return, California clearly asserts the kind of'distinct and
palpable injury' . . . that is required for standing." Id. at 160-161. The Court, however, retreated from its position in response to the Secretary's argument that the redressability requirement was not satisfied. According to the Secretary, even if California won the suit and
experimentation was ordered, there was no assurance that California would benefit immediately (since it could not show that it would be in an experimental area) or in the long run (since
it could not show that experimentation would ultimately lead to use of a system different from
the existing one). Id. at 161-62. To these observations, the Court responded:
The essence of California's complaint, however, is that the Secretary ...

,

by

failing to test non-cash-bonus systems, has breached a statutory obligation to determine through experiment which bidding system works best. According to California, only by testing non-cash- bonus systems can the Secretary ... carry out his duty
to use the best bidding systems and thereby assure California a fair return for its
resources.

Id. (emphasis added). The Court, however, assumed that the Secretary would adopt the system shown by experimentation to be the best one. This did not solve the problem of redressability since the best system could well be the existing one. Consequently, the only injury that
an order requiring experimentation would redress is the injury to California's statutorily secured interest in experimentation. See also Committee for Full Employment v. Blumenthal,
606 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Complainants are injured if this procedural right [to
review and investigation of discrimination complaints] is denied them, regardless of whether
their complaint is ultimately found meritorious."). Cf id. at 1068 (Tamm, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("Standing to sue in federal court must be based on more than allegations of violations of procedural regulations by an agency. In my view, injury to an underlying substantive
interest must be alleged.").
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The Relationship Between Statutory Legal Interests and Common
Law Public Value Interests in the Two Models of Injury

Analysis
The foregoing analysis presented two distinct models of injury analysis. Nevertheless, as independent and distinct as the models may appear, the categories are not hermetically sealed. In adjudicating public
values according to an intuitive social value system, all data is taken into
account, including the requirements of positive law. Since statutory policy forms some evidence of society's values, the Court is clearly affected
by the overall statutory topography when it engages in common law public value adjudication even though it may not acknowledge that effect."
For example, in Camp the Court mentioned, and in Sierra Club v. Mor66
ton 65 and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group
found, injury to environmental and aesthetic interests, observing that
"[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
64. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO AND H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973) ("The demarca-

tion between 'statutory interpretation' or 'constitutional interpretation', on the one hand, and
judge-made law on the other, is not a sharp line. Statutory interpretation shades into judicial
lawmaking on a spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative advertance to the issue at hand
attenuates."). See also Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV L. REv. 1, 30-34 (1975). Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. RPv. 1, 3-5 (1985) C" 'Federal common law,' as I use the term,
means any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative
federal text-whether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in
either a conventional or unconventional sense."(footnote omitted)).
The difficulty of separating the statutory and common law modes of injury analysis is
compounded by courts switching between the two virtually in mid-sentence. See, eg., Watt v.
Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1981). In addition, perhaps due to an
abundance of caution, some courts feel the need to state a procedural injury partly in terms of
a risk of impairment to the more tangible public value-sanctioned interests. For example, in
City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975), the Court stated:
The procedural injury implicit in agency failure to prepare an EIS [environmental impact statement]-the creation of a risk that serious environmental impacts will
be overlooked-is itself a sufficient 'injury in fact' to support standing, provided this
injury is alleged by a plaintiff having a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the
challenged project that he may be expected to suffer whatever environmental consequences the project may have.
Concern about "ripeness" might cause one to find fault with this choice of "threatened" injury.
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (injury may be "actual or threatened"). But see Duke
Power,438 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is remarkable that such a series of speculations [about possible future nuclear accidents in plants not yet built] is considered sufficient
either to make this litigation ripe for decision or to establish appellees' standing."). A less
convoluted route to injury in Coleman, which avoids ripeness problems, would be to find injury to the plaintiff's congressionally secured legal interest in an EIS.
65. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
66. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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important ingredients of the quality of life in our society." 67 It would be
difficult to imagine the Court reaching this conclusion prior to the
revolution in social awareness of environmental quality that has ensued
since 1968. And, although the Court cited no statutes in support of its
finding of injury, the National Environmental Policy Act of 196968 and
other federal statutes6 9 comprised a large part of that revolution.
The relationship between legislative action and public values is undoubtedly complex. One variable at work is the relative importance and
strength of the legislative statement. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that invasions of congressionally secured rights may constitute injury even though no injury exists apart from the statute. 70 This is a
sensible observation, since many congressionally created rights are relatively technical and their counterparts in a social value system often do
not exist. 7 1 For those statutory policy statements that are important
enough that public value counterparts to them can be identified, the
cause-and-effect relationship between the two is difficult to sort out. In
some cases, the statute may be a direct and obvious product of strong
social forces. In others, Congress may be well ahead of society in forging
new values. Most often the truer description is probably that the relationship is reciprocal, with the statute both reflecting and shaping public
values simultaneously. The important point here is that, while the statutory legal interest model focuses solely upon the legal rights created by
the statute and injury is automatic whenever a violation of those rights is
alleged, statutes may also be relevant, beyond the "mere" legal rights
they create, as evidence of broader public values.
Given this framework, it is theoretically possible that a legal right
originally created by statute could take on a life of its own in a social
value system and continue to be a public value without any further assistance from the statute. Thus, if Congress, in a sudden anti-environmentalist pique, were to repeal all environmental protection statutes
enacted to date, the courts might still recognize environmental well-being
67. Id. at 74 n.18 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
69. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1983); Federal Water Pollution Control Acts of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1266 (1983).
70. See supra note 44.
71. The "technical" label could well be pinned on the procedural requirements involved
in Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981) (experimentation with bidding
systems); National Conservative Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 626 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (comment opportunity); and City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1975)
(EIS). See supra note 61-63 and accompanying text. But see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E.

COOPER, supra note I, at § 3531.4, at 433-34 (quoted infra note 164).
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as an important ingredient in the quality of life in our society.7 2
II.

The Supreme Court's Rejection of a Legal Interest Model
as a Basis for Injury When Constitutional Rights are
Violated and the Continuing Conundrum of
"Constitutional Injury" Cases

At various times individual Justices of the Court and commentators
have argued that a legal interest injury model similar to the one applied
when violations of statutory rights are involved should be applied to
rights secured by constitutional provisions.7 3 Under this theory, the
Constitution would create legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the constitutional
provision.7 4
This was Justice Stewart's dissenting position in United States v.
Richardson." In Richardson, the plaintiff contended that a denial of his
request for a copy of the CIA budget violated the constitutional provision that "'a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.' "76
In Justice Stewart's view, the plaintiff had standing:
He [plaintiff] contends that the Statement and Account Clause
gives him a right to receive the information and burdens the Government with a correlative duty to supply it. Courts of law exist
for the resolution of such right-duty disputes. When a party is
seeking a judicial determination that a defendant owes him an affirmative duty, it seems clear to me that he has standing to litigate
the issue of the existence vel non of this duty once he shows that
the defendant has declined to honor his claim.7 7
This position was rejected by the majority, which held that the plaintiff's
72. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734. The same cross-pollination phenomenon exists with
respect to statutes and the general common law. In Lohmann v. Lohmann, 50 N.J. Super. 37,
171 A.2d 84 (1958), the plaintiff wife sued her husband for an accounting of rents and profits
received from their business partnership. A statutory right to such an accounting had existed
in the state since 1705, but the statute was repealed in 1951. Nonetheless, the court held that
an accounting was available as a matter of common law in view of the tradition and recognition of the right embodied in the statute. Id. at 92-93. See also State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495,
129 A.2d 715 (1957) (drawing upon the common law power to correct a criminal sentence
after the statutory basis therefor had been repealed).
73. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (Justice Stewart), note 85 (Justice Brennan), notes 87-89 and note 134 and accompanying text (commentators).
74. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
75. 418 U.S. 166, 202-07 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 168 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl.
7).
77. Id. at 203 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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allegation only amounted to a "generalized grievance"78 and did not constitute "concrete injury." 79
In the companion case of Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War,8 the plaintiffs contended that members of Congress holding
reserve commissions in the armed forces were in violation of Article I,
section 6 of the Constitution. In an analysis similar to that in Richardson, the majority in Reservists labelled any effect on the plaintiff caused
by the alleged violation "an abstract injury."8 " Interestingly, although
violation of the right secured by the constitutional provision was insufficient in itself to constitute injury, the majority noted that it had "no
doubt that if Congress had enacted a statute creating such a legal right,
the requisite injury for standing would be found in an invasion of that

right.

' '8 2

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of
Church and State8 3 provides an even more definitive rejection of the application of a legal interest injury model to constitutional rights violations. The Court in Valley Forge, relying on Richardson and Reservists,
stated that the "assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government
conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Article III without draining those
requirements of meaning." 84 The Court overturned the Third Circuit's
holding that the Establishment Clause creates in every citizen a " 'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish religion." 85 To emphasize its rejection of the legal interest model, the Valley
Forge majority noted:
Were we to recognize standing premised on an 'injury' consisting
solely of an alleged violation of a 'personal constitutional right' to a
government that does not establish religion, a principled consis78. Id. at 176-177.
79. Id. at 179-180.
80. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
81. Id. at 217. Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Richardson, voted with the majority
in Reservists. See infra note 250.
82. Id. at 224 n.14 (emphasis added).
83. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
84. Id. at 483.
85. Id. (quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. HEW, 619 F.2d
252, 265 (3d Cir. 1980)). Justice Brennan argued in dissent:
When the Constitution makes it clear that a particular person is to be protected from
a particular form of government action, then that person has a 'right' to be free of
that action; when that right is infringed, then there is injury, and a personal stake,
within the meaning of Article III.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 493 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority responded to this
argument charging that it amounted to a "substitution of 'legal interest' . . . for 'standing'."
454 U.S. at 484 n.20.
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tency would dictate recognition of respondents' standing to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal
right to a government that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to challenge every affirmative-action program
on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not deny
equal protection of the laws, to choose but two among as many
possible examples as there are commands in the Constitution.8 6
The paradox of cognizable injury resulting from invasions of statutory rights, but not from invasions of constitutional rights, has been criticized. Professor Nichol suggests that "the rights reflected in the
Constitution merit every bit as much judicial protection as do those contained in the United States Code." 8 7 Professor Doernberg takes a slightly
different tack, He argues, based on the "social compact" theory of
Locke, that violations of "collective constitutional rights" should form
an appropriate basis for standing 88 and that a slightly modified form of
citizen standing should be recognized by the Court.89 However valid
these criticisms, the decisions of the Court clearly reject any application
of a legal interest injury model.
Despite the statements in the above cases, the Court persists in finding or assuming standing in cases that do not appear to fit any traditional
injury mold. The cases are predominantly in four areas: equal protection, procedural due process, religious freedom, and reapportionment.
A.

Equal Protection and Procedural Due Process Cases: The Problem
of Ineligible Injury

The equal protection and procedural due process cases are considered together because the injury problem in both is intertwined with the
requirement of redressability. In these cases, there is no difficulty identifying tangible injury caused by the allegedly illegal action. However,
that injury is ineligible for consideration in the standing calculus because
it does not satisfy the redressability requirement. The equal protection
and procedural due process cases thus parallel the standing problem in
NationalConservationPoliticalAction Committee v. FEC.90 In that case,
86. Id. at 489 n.26 (citation omitted). See also Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3327-28
n.21 (1984).
87. Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.
L. REv. 798, 817 (1983) [hereinafter Nichol, Standing]. See supra note 60. Constitutional
rights seem to score lower than rights reflected in the Code of Federal Regulations and "past
practices" of an administrative agency. See National Conservative Political Action Comm. v.
FEC, 626 F.2d 953, 957-58, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also K. DAvis, supra note 9, at § 24:20
(criticizing Richardson and Reservists on similar grounds).
88. Doernberg, supra note 9.
89. Doernberg, supra note 9, at 110-17.
90. 626 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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the injury to the plaintiffs caused by the FEC's advisory opinion allowing
the Democratic National Committee to pay compaign debts did not qualify as injury for standing purposes, because plaintiffs could not show that
relief providing them with the opportunity to comment on the opinion's
legality would change the content of the opinion.9" The difference, of
course, between statutory procedural rights cases and constitutional ones
is that in constitutional cases the legal interest model is not available.9 2
Redressability as a standing requirement was conceived in Linda
R.S. v. RichardD.9 3 In Linda R.S., an unwed-mother sought an injunction against the discriminatory application of a Texas statute permitting
criminal non-support prosecutions to be brought against fathers of legitimate children but not against fathers of illegitimate children.9 4 The
Court defined the relevant injury as lack of child support and denied
standing. It did so because the plaintiff failed to show that the relief
requested would provide her with child support, since the prosecution
she sought "would result only in the jailing of the child's father."9 5 The
prospect that prosecution would result in support payments was described as "at best ... only speculative." 96
As one commentator has pointed out, a change in the definition of
the injury involved would satisfy the redressability requirement.9 7 If the
plaintiff redefined her injury as a denial of equal treatment, that injury
clearly could be redressed by a decree mandating equal consideration of
criminal complaints by unwed mothers. The problem with redefining the
injury this way is that a denial of equal treatment is injury only if there
exists some interest in or right to equal treatment, the most logical source
of which would seem to be a personal constitutional right secured by the
Equal Protection Clause.9"
91. See supra text at notes 61-63.
92. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
93. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
94. Id. at 616.
95. Id. at 618.
96. Id.
97. See., e.g., Nichol, supra note 2, at 80.
98. Ironically, the Linda R.S. Court, in a footnote, approved the district court's observation that "the proper party to challenge the constitutionality of [the statute] would be a legitimate child's parent who has been prosecuted under the statute. Such a challenge would allege
that because the parents of illegitimate children may not be prosecuted, the statute unfairly
discriminates against the parents of legitimate children." 410 U.S. at 619 n.5. This statement
is ironic because the same redressability problems exist. Barring acceptance of an injury to an
interest in equal treatment, the relevant injury to the legitimate father is the burden of undergoing prosecution and any sanctions imposed upon conviction. If the father wins his equal
protection claim, however, it will not remove this injury since the state may comply with the
Court's holding by simply prosecuting fathers of illegitimate children as well. The prospect
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Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke99 presented the same
difficulty as Linda R.S. v. Richard D., but the Court in Bakke had no
problem redefining the injury in the manner suggested above. Bakke
sued the University of California claiming that its affirmative action program for medical school admissions violated equal protection. Under the
injury in fact requirement, the logical injury would be denial of admission. However, redressability would have required Bakke to show that,
but for the illegal affirmative action program, he would have been admitted. The Court surmounted this problem by finding a redressable "injury
... in the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all
100 places in the class.... "I" Since nonwhite applicants were allowed
to compete for all 100 places, the Court, in effect, found injury to an
interest in equal treatment. 10 1
The most recent case addressing the problem, Heckler v. Mathews, 10 2 explicitly adopting this position, held that "the right to equal
that the state would simply forego all prosecutions of nonsupporting parents is even less than
"speculative." Id. at 618.
99. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
100. Id. at 281 n.14.
101. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), presented the same problem as Linda R.S. and
Bakke. Mr. Orr mounted an equal protection challenge to the Alabama alimony statute which
allowed alimony awards to wives, but not husbands. Since he made no claim for alimony, his
only injury was the alimony award ordered against him by the Alabama courts. However, the
Alabama legislature could comply with any equal protection holding of the Supreme Court by
simply extending the statutory authorization of alimony to permit awards to husbands as well.
Thus, the Court's holding the statute unconstitutional would not redress Mr. Orr's injury,
since it would not relieve him of his alimony obligation. Id. at 271-72.
Orris interesting because of the Court's efforts to justify standing on a basis other than an
injury to a right of equal treatment. The Court's first response to the problem was to assert
that "unless we are to hold that underinclusive statutes can never be challenged because any
plaintiff's success can theoretically be thwarted, Mr. Orr must be held to have standing here."
Id. at 272 (emphasis in original). This contradicts the Court's statements elsewhere that "[tihe
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a
reason to find standing." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489 (quoting Reservists, 418 U.S. at 227).
The Orr Court's second response was to assert that "[we] do not deny standing simply because
the 'appellant, although prevailing here on the federal constitutional issue, may or may not
ultimately win [his] lawsuit."' Orr, 440 U.S. at 273 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
18 (1975)). This is difficult to reconcile with the results in such cases as Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975), in
which the Court rejected just such an argument by the plaintiffs.
A third response to the problem, contained in a footnote, was the allegation that a genderneutral statute passed in response to the equal protection holding would do away with certain
collateral gender-related factors traditionally used in determining the amount of alimony
awards. This could result in a possible lower alimony award against Mr. Orr on remand. Id. at
273 n.3. The Court, however, eschewed any reliance on this allegation since it believed that
standing had been demonstrated on the other two bases. In any event, the Court gave short
shrift to similar elaborations of possibilities in Warth, Simon and Linda R.S.
102. 465 U.S. 728 (1984).

76
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treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not coextensive with any
substantive rights to the benefits denied the party discriminated
against." 10 3 Consequently, "those persons who are personally denied
equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored
group" suffer injury regardless of whether other tangible interests are affected by the challenged action."4
Mathews presented an even more difficult redressability problem
than Linda R.S. or Bakke, because in Mathews it was clear that the
plaintiff could not benefit in any tangible way from the relief requested.
In Mathews, plaintiff was denied Social Security benefits because the
"pension offset" provision of the Social Security Act required that the
amount of his benefits be offset by the pension he was receiving. 10 5 The
pension offset provision did not apply to similarly situated women, and.
Mathews sued to invalidate the law on equal protection grounds. Congress, however, had included a severability clause in the law which provided for the equal application of the provision to all Social Security
applicants, male or female, in the event the offset provision was declared
invalid. 0 6 Defining the relevant injury as a denial of Social Security benefits would fail to present an injury that could be redressed by a decision
in Mathews' favor.'0 7 Consequently, at the government's suggestion, 10 8 a
unanimous Court redefined the injury as an invasion of Mathews' "right
to equal treatment."' 1 9 That injury could be redressed:
by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class.... Because the severability clause would forbid only the latter and not the former kind of
relief in this case, the injury caused by the unequal treatment allegedly suffered by appellee may 'be redressed by favorable decision'
•.. and he therefore has standing to prosecute this action.110
103. Id. at 739.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 735-36.
106. Id. at 734.
107. Id. at 738.
108. Brief of Appellant at 48-49, Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984). See also Miller,
ConstitutionalRemedies for UnderinclusiveStatutes: A Critical Appraisal of Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 102-04, 120-30 (1985) (an article by one of Mr. Mathews' counsel labelling the standing holding regarding injury "a dangerous fiction" and
arguing that the severability clause was an unconstitutional attempt to divest the federal courts
ofjurisdiction).
109. 465 U.S. at 738.
110. Id. at 738-39. Interestingly, Justice Brennan does not cite Bakke in support of this
conclusion and cites Orr v. Orr, see supra note 101 only as part of a footnote string cite for the
proposition that two remedial options are open to a court finding an equal protection violation.
Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739 n.6.
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The Court in Mathews observed that, similar to invasions of the
right to equal protection, invasions of the right to procedural due process, without more, can result in injury."1 As with equal protection
claims, the problem with injury to procedural due process stems from the
redressability requirement. A hypothetical demonstrates this problem.
A person applies for but is denied a driver's license. She sues, contending
that procedural due process requires that she be given a statement of
reasons for the denial and an opportunity for a hearing to contest the
denial. If the relevant injury is deprivation of the license itself, then that
injury is remedied only by an order giving the plaintiff the license. The
more likely remedy, however, is simply an order to provide the plaintiff
with a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a hearing. Since it is
unknown whether the plaintiff would win the hearing, the remedy may
not redress the injury. However, if the injury were redefined as the failure to receive procedural protections, that injury would be redressed by
an order mandating a statement of reasons and a hearing.
Although the Mathews opinion cites no standing cases in support of
the proposition, the Court has decided numerous procedural due process
cases without questioning whether there was any injury other than the
by the nonexistence of the procedural
"injury" occasioned
12
opportunities.'
111. Id. at 739 ("These decisions [regarding underinclusive equal protection challenges]
demonstrate that, like the right to procedural due process, . . . the right to equal treatment
guaranteed by the Constitution is not co-extensive with any substantive rights to the benefits
denied the party discriminated against.") (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1978) (college professor's contract was
not renewed and he claimed he was entitled to notice of reasons and a hearing under the Due
Process Clause). The Court discussed in Perry and its companion case, Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), what sort of "property interest" was necessary to trigger due process protections and concluded that there must be some "legitimate claim of entitlement."
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The Court observed in Perry: "Proof of such a property interest...
would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate college
officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his
nonretention and challenge their sufficiency." 408 U.S. at 603. Thus, unless lack of procedural protections qualifies as injury, the plaintiffs in Roth and Perry did not have standing.
Procedural due process cases in which the merits were reached and neither redressability
nor any other standing problems were mentioned, include Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(school suspension); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary action);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocations); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (replevin of goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license suspensions);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing rights upon termination of welfare benefits);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment). But cf Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. at 87 ("It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing
on the contractual right to continued possession and use of the goods.").
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Reapportionment and Religious Freedom Cases: The Problem of
Non-existent Injury

The reapportionment and religious freedom cases differ from the
equal protection and procedural due process cases in that the injury
problem is not that the redressability requirement eliminates from consideration more tangible interests; rather, rarely if ever can any tangible
interest be identified at all. These cases thus parallel the standing
problems of the housing discrimination tester in Havens Realty in that it
was just such an inability to find any tangible interest in that case that
forced the Court to search for and find an injury in the violation of the
tester's statutory right to truthful information about housing.1 13 That
1 14
route to standing is foreclosed in the constitutional context, however.
In the voting rights area, Baker v. Carr115 still seems to be good
standing law despite the difficulty in finding concrete injury in reapportionment cases-unless violation of a "personal constitutional right" to
vote constitutes injury. The Court's observation regarding the source of
injury in Baker was the "citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action [-a judicially recognized] right secured by the Constitution,"1' 16 followed by the conclusion that plaintiffs "are asserting 'a
plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of
their votes.' "117 In Reservists, where the injury to an asserted constitutional right was described as "abstract," Baker was distinguished as a
case involving "concrete injury to fundamental voting rights."1 1 But, as
the Court observed in Valley Forge:
[T]he plaintiffs in [Reservists and Richardson] plainly asserted
a 'personal right' to have the Government act in accordance with
their views of the Constitution ....Each [constitutional provision]
establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is
bound to honor-to no greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution.... [W]e know of no principled basis
on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United States.1 19
113. See supra text following note 60.

114. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
115. 369 U.S. 186 (1965).
116. Id. at 208.
117. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)).
118. 418 U.S. at 223 n.13.
119. 454 U.S. at 483-84. See also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. Cf Nichol,
supra note 87, at 835 ("Both [Reservists and Baker] represent attempts to alleviate intangible
limitations upon the ability of citizens to be heard in the legislature .... Is the magnitude of
that [diluted vote] injury any greater than the injuries complained of in Reservists Committee,
Richardson, and a variety of other cases dismissed for lack of 'injury'?").
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If any injury appears to fit the legal interest mold, it is the "injury"
occasioned by government violation of the Establishment Clause. Abington School District v. Schempp 12 ° and Engel v. Vitale, 121 decided before
the advent of injury in fact and in the heyday of "legal injury,"1'22 established injury based on the fact that the challenged "religious exercises...
are being conducted in direct violation of the [plaintiffs' Establishment
Clause] rights."12' 3
The Court, however, disapproved application of a legal interest test
in Valley Forge, holding that standing could not be shown based upon a
"personal constitutional right" secured by the Establishment Clause.
The Court distinguished Schempp as a case in which the plaintiffs "had
standing, not because their complaint rested on the Establishment Clause
...but because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to
avoid them."12' 4 Even accepting this revisionist approach to Schempp,
one might ask why "unwelcome religious exercises" constitute injury to
school children while equally if not more "unwelcome" pop quizzes on
long division do not. The answer can only lie in the determination that
"religious exercises" do not belong in the public schools while "math
exercises" do. The obvious source of this determination-the Establishment Clause-is eliminated by the Court, and no other source of the
underlying normative judgment is acknowledged. Despite this puzzling
state of affairs, the Court continues to decide Schempp-type Establishment Clause cases on the merits without even a hint that cognizable injury may be lacking.' 25
Another strange phenomenon in the religious freedom area is that
the Valley Forge opinion makes it clear that federal taxpayer standing
120. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (contesting school district requirement that passages from the
Bible be read in public school).
121. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (contesting recitation of a nondenominational "Regent's prayer").
122. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
123. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224. This injury could be shown regardless of "whether [the
challenged practices] operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." Engel, 370
U.S. at 430. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2492 n.51 (1985).
124. Valley Forge,454 U.S. at 486 n.22. But cf.id. (noting in dictum that Schempp was an
example of cognizable injury to plaintiffs' "spiritual stake in First Amendment values") (quoting Camp, 397 U.S. at 154).
125. A recent example is Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985), a case involving claims
by a parent that a state statute allowing "meditation or voluntary prayer" in the public schools
violated the First Amendment. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (residents of
cities suing to enjoin city's annual Christmas creche), reh'g. denied 104 S. Ct. 2376 (1984). For
other cases, see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3531.4, at 427-29.
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under Flast v. Cohen126 continues to exist, at least for challenges to congressional actions taken pursuant to the Spending Clause which allegedly
violate the Establishment Clause.127 The continuation of Flast-type taxpayer standing was approved despite the Court's statements in Valley
Forge and its citation with approval to numerous other statements that
doubt whether taxpayers suffer any real injury. For example, the Court
noted that Frothingham v. Mellon128 established that "[a]ny tangible effect of the challenged statute on the plaintiff's tax burden was 'remote,
fluctuating and uncertain.' "129 And the Court also noted that Doremus
v. Board of Education1 3 ° established "that the expenditure of public

funds in an allegedly unconstitutional manner is not an injury sufficient
to confer standing, even though the plaintiff contributes to the public
coffers as a taxpayer." 3 ' This was because the "interests of a taxpayer in
the moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for an appeal to the preventive powers
126. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Flast held that a taxpayer has standing to challenge governmental
action if he meets two "nexus" requirements. The first nexus between the taxpayer status and
the governmental action challenged permits a taxpayer to challenge only congressional action
pursuant to the Taxing and Spending Clause. The second nexus between the taxpayer status
and the constitutional provision he seeks to enforce requires the taxpayer to demonstrate that
the constitutional provision is a specific limitation on the taxing and spending power. Id. at
102-03. In Flast,the plaintiff challenged, on First Amendment grounds, the federal funding of
educational materials for use in religious schools. Since the congressional action was taken
pursuant to the Taxing and Spending Clause, the plaintiff satisfied the first nexus. As to the
second nexus, the Court concluded that "one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted
the Establishment Clause... was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor
one religion over another or to support religion in general." Id. at 103. Consequently, the
plaintiff satisfied the second nexus requirement.
127. Valley Forge distinguished Flast on two rather unsatisfying bases. First, plaintiffs in
Valley Forge sued to enjoin a HEW decision to transfer a surplus hospital to the Assemblies of
God. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not meet the second nexus test of Flast, which the Court read
as limited to exercises of congressional, not executive, power. 454 U.S. at 479. Second, plaintiffs failed the first nexus test of Flastbecause the transfer was made by HEW under the Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, rather than the Taxing and Spending Clause. 454
U.S. at 480. Thus, there was no nexus between the taxpayer status and the Taxing and Spending Clause. Both these bases for distinguishing Flast are subject to criticism. See id. at 510-12
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, it would appear that after Valley Forge, federal taxpayer standing is limited to challenging the validity of congressional action taken pursuant to
the Spending Clause, which expends public funds, as opposed to transferring surplus property,
in aid of religion.
128. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
129. 454 U.S. at 477 (quoting Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487). The Court noted that Flasttype taxpayer standing was a narrow exception to the "Frothingham principle." 454 U.S. at
481.
130. 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Doremus involved facts similar to Schempp, Engle, and Wallace-religious exercises in public school classrooms-but standing was not allowed to plaintiffs as state taxpayers. The Schempp "spiritual stake" injury was not found either.
131. 454 U.S. at 477.
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of the Court over their manner of expenditure." '
According to the
Valley Forge Court, in such cases, the "plaintiffs' grievance [is] 'not a
direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference.' "133
Without necessarily disapproving of the Valley Forge Court's decision not to overrule Flast, the Court's recognition of the continued existence of any federal taxpayer standing is a bit puzzling in the post-Camp
era of "distinct and palpable" injury in fact. Whatever governmental action is challenged, even the congressional financial aid to religion falling
within the scope of Flast,it is apparent that no "dollars-and-cents" injury
exists for taxpayers. An increase in one's tax obligation cannot be tied to
commencement of the challenged conduct and, even if it could, cessation
of that conduct certainly would not mean that one's tax burden would be
134
decreased.
132. Id. at 478 (quoting Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. at 429, 433 (1982)).
133. Id. (quoting Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1982)). See Nichol, supra
note 87, at 838: "Since there is little possibility that a successful suit will reduce the plaintiff's
tax bill, the only claim a taxpayer can possibly assert is a right that the government spend his
money in a legal fashion." Cf infra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
Municipal taxpayers are treated differently because, unlike the federal taxpayer, whose
interest is "shared with millions of others," Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487, the "interest of a
taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its monies is direct and immediate and the
remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate." Id. at 486. One might well
question whether municipalities are any more likely to refund taxes paid than the federal government. The continued availability of standing for state taxpayers to challenge even in-kind
subsidies to religion after Valley Forge was recognized recently in Grand Rapids School Dist.
v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3221 n.15 (1985).
134. Some commentators have noted the apparent aberrational nature of some of the cases,
but their explanations are less than satisfying. Professor Nichol has argued that the Establishment Clause and reapportionment cases, when contrasted with Richardson, Reservists, and
Valley Forge, demonstrate that the Court does not take the injury requirement seriously, but
only selectively imposes it to deny review for reasons unrelated to standing. Nichol, supra note
87, at 832-36 and Nichol, Abusing Standing,supra note 9, at 658-59. See also Tushnet, The
New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977) and K.
DAVIS, supra note 9, § 24:1, at 209 ("The Court tends to manipulate the law of standing in
order to produce wanted substantive results, so that the generalizations about standing often
collide with other generalizations similarly motivated.").
More charitably, but just as unhelpfully, Wright, Miller and Cooper note that injury to
"abstract interests" has been found in the Court's standing decisions involving "interests in the
electoral process, [and] various First Amendment values... because courts believe that protection of individual constitutional rights is a central part of the role assigned to the judiciary
in the separation of powers." C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3531.4,

at 426-27. While these observations may be correct, the Court has not indicated that standing
requirements may be "trumped" by an overriding need to get to the merits or by extraneous
policy considerations. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984) ("[tlhe law of Art. III
standing is built upon a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers."). But cf infra
notes 264-267 and accompanying text. Any proffered doctrinal explanations have been based
upon the legal interest injury analysis, which the Court has explicitly rejected. See supranotes
74-89 and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, such "legal injury" theories fail to explain the
rationale of the Richardson and Reservists decisions, except by reference to doctrines outside
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III. Application of the Common Law Public Value Model to
Violations of Constitutional Rights
Professor Davis has stated that "[t]he cure for manipulation of the
law of standing is not abandonment of principle; the cure is a strengthening of the principle and a stronger insistence that it be followed." 3 '
Concurring in his view and acknowledging that the Court has no intention of altering its standing requirements despite strong criticism, I believe an obligation exists to find a principled explanation for the Court's
holdings in the above "constitutional injury" cases that does as little violence as possible to established precedent. 3 6
A.

Public Value Interests Corresponding to Constitutional Guarantees

As noted in Part II above, Valley Forge and other cases clearly reject
any notion that the statutory legal interest model can be applied to constitutional violations.13 7 Nothing in Valley Forge or other cases, however, indicates that the common law public value model is not available.
Indeed, the Valley Forge opinion implies it is available when it states,
immediately after rejecting the "personal constitutional right" theory,
that "[i]n reaching this conclusion, we do not retreat from our earlier
' 138
holdings that standing may be predicated on noneconomic injury."
The common law public value model relies upon finding interests
protected by a social value system that exists apart from, but which is
related to, the legal value system. 139 It is my position that the Court can
and does exercise its power to find social values corresponding with and
underlying some of the basic constitutional guarantees, social values of
sufficient magnitude and quality to support a finding of injury. Thus,
injury exists in the invasion of the interest in the full impact of one's vote,
standing that the Court did not acknowledge. Thus, the legal theories are not responsive to the
Court's disclaimer of a hierarchy of constitutional rights under which the legal force of any
given constitutional provision is no greater than that of any other. See Valley Forge,454 U.S.
at 484-85.
135. K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 24:6, at 230 (emphasis omitted).
136. Prof. Nichol has apparently at least retreated from, if not surrendered, the battle over
making sense of the standing doctrine. In his latest article he comments: "It may well be...
that the Supreme Court has no desire to make sense of the standing doctrine. As the doctrine
presently exists, standing can apparently be either rolled out or ignored in order to serve unstated and unexamined values." Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 9, at 658. After cataloging the cases denying standing (mainly those brought by minorities, poor persons, and civil
libertarians) and those granting standing (mainly cases where the decision upholds government
power), he concludes his article with the acid observation that "[o]ne could perhaps be forgiven for confusing standing's agenda with that of the New Right." Id. at 659.
137. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
138. 454 U.S. at 486 (citing SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686-88 and Camp, 397 U.S. at 153-54).
139. See supra notes 20-47, 65-72 and accompanying text.
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in avoiding state-sponsored religious exercises, in equal treatment, and in
procedurally fair treatment, because each of these interests in a more
general sense has become a "trait and motive of behavior widely enough
shared to permit us to recognize it as a social role."'" The Court recognizes the injury because "the effect complained of can be cast in terms of
public values," 14 ' irrespective of whether the constitutional provisions
themselves secure a legally protected right. The legal commands of the
relevant constitutional provisions are not irrelevant to the public value
determination. Rather, they play the same indirect role that federal statutes do in the public value adjudication process: they are "some evidence" of society's values.
Separating the intuitive public value interests corresponding to a
constitutional provision from the legal rights secured by the provision is
admittedly a difficult task. Despite this difficulty, a second look at the
cases in each of the four constitutional areas previously discussed discloses an effort by the Court to search beyond the legal rights secured by
the constitutional provision in question and find corresponding public
value interests that are invaded by the challenged government action. In
addition, we find further support from other sources for the conclusions
reached.
L

Recognized Public Value Interests Correspondingto Constitutional
Guarantees

a. The Interest in Equal Treatment
The search for public value interests is evidenced in the many cases
in which the Court describes the injury in everyday nonlegal terms. For
instance, in Bakke, rather than use the legal jargon of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court defined the injury as "the University's decision not
to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because
of his race." 42 In Mathews, the Court used the terms "right to equal
treatment" and "discrimination"-not "equal protection."' 43 Equally
important in Mathews was the Court's focus on the real psychological
impact that discrimination causes rather than the legal criteria for showing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause:
[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic
notions' or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as 'innately inferior' and therefore as less worthy participants in the
140.

J. VINING,

supra note 6, at 61.

141. Id
142. 438 U.S. at 281 n.14.
143. 465 U.S. at 739.
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political community,... can cause serious non-economic injuries
to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely
because of their membership in a disfavored group.'"
The Court's intent in Mathews to base injury upon broader concepts
of public values rather than legal rights, is revealed by examining the first
case cited in support of the above quotation-Bob Jones University v.
United States. 4 5 In Bob Jones University, the Court addressed the issue
of whether the Internal Revenue Service properly interpreted the "established public policy" when it required that private nonprofit educational
institutions provide equal treatment on racial grounds in order to qualify
as a "charitable" institution for the purpose of receiving tax-deductible
contributions from the public.' 4 6 The Court's inquiry was not whether
the institution's ban on interracial dating violated anyone's legal
rights, 47 but whether it evinced an institutional purpose "so at odds with
the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit
that [the institution] might otherwise ... [confer]."' 4 8 The Court drew
upon Brown v. Board of Education'4 9 and numerous other court decisions, congressional enactments, and executive orders to conclude that
"racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted
50
views of elementary justice."'1
144. Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). Admittedly, the Court's opinion initially refers to the interest as the "right to equal treatment
guaranteed by the Constitution." 465 U.S. at 739. Thereafter, however, the opinion speaks
more in public value injury terms. Despite the resulting ambiguity, the Court goes to great
lengths to avoid the simple solution of stating the interest in legal rights terms. The reason for
avoiding that simple solution is that accepting it would run afoul of the Valley Forge maxim
that violation of a "personal constitutional right" without more cannot provide sufficient injury for standing purposes. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text. See also Allen v.
Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). While finding that the plaintiffs in Allen were not "personally
denied equal treatment" and thus did not suffer injury, the Court observed that "the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination," is the "sort of non-economic injury [that]
is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in
some circumstances to support standing." Id. at 3327 (citing Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739.)) See
infra notes 218-256 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of deciding whether or not
a particular litigant has been "personally" injured with respect to a public value interest).
145. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
146. Id. at 586.
147. Cf Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies to bar racial
discrimination in private schools).
148. 461 U.S. at 592.
149. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
150. 461 U.S. at 592. The Court's use of social science data in Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11,
suggests another possible source of data for courts to use in their search for evidence of public
values. The use of social science studies in Brown to support the Court's equal protection
decision has been vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence,1955 Survey of American Law, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955). Aside from problems with ethical neutrality or legal
irrelevance of social science data when used to give content to judicially fashioned substantive
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Although the Bob Jones University decision parsed intuitive notions
of "elementary justice" as they applied to racial discrimination in education, there is no reason to believe that the denial of equal treatment in
any context on any discriminatory ground would not be recognized as
injury by the "common community conscience." 15' 1 Indeed, the Court's
decision in Brown and the civil rights movement that it sparked have
served but as models for other minority and disadvantaged groups to
press their demands for equality both in and out of court. The result has
been unprecedented expansion of the concept of equal treatment beyond
racial equality in equal protection cases l1 2 and a virtual explosion of federal and state statutes prohibiting discrimination on numerous grounds
in virtually every public and private undertaking. 5 3 The progression of
society's notions of equality and awareness of the evils of discrimination
in all its forms exemplifed by these developments are ample support for
the Court's observation in Mathews that unequal treatment causes cognirules of conduct, an additional problem is that the substantive law is normative while social
science data presumably is not.
Concerned with ordering men's conduct in accordance with certain standards, values, and societal goals, the legal system is a prescriptive and normative one dealing
with the "ought to be." Much scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is purely
descriptive; its "laws" seek not to control or judge the phenomena of the real world,
but to describe and explain them in neutral terms.
Korn, Law, FactandScience in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV.1080, 1093-94 (1966). At least
this objection to the use of social science data does not apply to its use in the injury adjudication process, because the purpose of the injury adjudication is to reflect what is considered
injury by society, not what ought to be considered injury.
151. 461 U.S. at 592.
152. Some of these cases, grouped by discriminatory characteristic, are: sex, Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7 (1975), Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); alienage, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), Nyquist v. Mauclet 432 U.S. 1 (1977); illegitimacy,Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973), Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), New Jersy Welfare Rights Org. v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); mental condition,
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1980), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.
Ct. 3249 (1985). Other discriminatory characteristics have not fared as well but evidence the
sensitivity of the era that produced them. See, e.g., wealth, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); age, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
153. See, eg., federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on numerous grounds in employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e-17)(1984), housing, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631(1984); public
accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(a-6)(1984), and all activities receiving federal
funding, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)-2000(d-6)(1984). The parallel state laws are too numerous to
mention here, but recognition of the widespread availability of state remedies for discrimination is evidenced by the requirement in some federal anti-discrimination statutes that claimants
first seek relief from a parallel state agency before pursuing the matter in the federal forum
provided. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-5)(c)(1984).
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zable injury in fact.' 54
b. The Interest in Procedurally Fair Treatment

The Court in Mathews observed that the "right to equal treatment"

'
is "like the right to procedural due process" 155
with respect to the

noneconomic injury occasioned by its denial. Unfortunately, the Mathews Court cited no standing cases to support the statement and research discloses no cases in which injury to an interest in procedurally
fair treatment provided the basis for standing. In support of its conclusion, however, the Mathews opinion cited Carey v. Piphus,156 a case involving claims for money damages for an unconstitutional suspension
from public school. Though the relevance of a constitutional tort action
to standing injury is not immediately apparent, the parallel becomes clear
upon an examination of Carey.
In Carey, the plaintiffs, suspended from school without the required
procedural due process protections, 5 7 had their suit dismissed for lack of
158
proof of any injuries resulting from the admittedly illegal suspensions.
The Court was called upon to determine whether, in the absence of proof
of punitive or compensatory damages, an action for violation of the procedural due process right to a hearing could be sustained.' 59 The Court

held that it could, since "[e]ven if [the plaintiffs'] suspensions were justi154. It is not clear whether injury to the interest in equal treatment is limited to circumstances in which the alleged discrimination is along traditionally "suspect" or "quasi suspect"
lines or whether it would apply to support a finding of injury in cases in which the so-called
"rational basis" equal protection standard is applied. The broader reading of the scope of the
injury is obliquely suggested by a cryptic footnote in Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
As pointed out supra note 144, Allen recognized the possibility of injury to the interest in equal
treatment, but rejected the Allen plaintiffs' claim that they suffered injury by reason of the
IRS's overly lax enforcement of the requirement that private schools claiming charitable tax
exemption status have nondiscriminatory admission policies. The Court noted:
We assume, arguendo, that the asserted stigmatic injury may be caused by the
Government's grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools even if the
Government is granting those exemptions without knowing or believing that the
schools in fact discriminate. That is, we assume, without deciding, that the challenged Government tax exemptions are the equivalent of Government
discrimination.
Id. at 3326 n.20. The aspect of all unequal treatment that causes its victims to have the psychological reactions described by the Court in Mathews is the conviction that they are treated
differently than other people who, from all relevant appearances, are in the same position.
Thus, it would seem that the injury caused by "rational basis" unequal treament should be
treated the same as "suspect" classification unequal treatment.
155. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739. See supra note 111 for full quotation.
156. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
157. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students facing short-term suspension are
entitled to due process safeguards of notice and hearing).
158. Carey, 435 U.S. at 248-52.
159. Id. at 266.
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fled, and even if they did not suffer any other actual injury, the fact remains that [they] were deprived of their right to procedural due process"
and were thus entitled to nominal damages. 6 '
To evidence the "importance to organized society" of an "absolute"
right to procedural fairness, the Court in Carey cited the concurring
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in JointAnti-FascistRefugee Committee v.
McGrath, 1 -an opinion emphasizing the prominent place of procedural
protections in our shared collective sense of fairness. Justice Frankfurter
observed:
[V]alidity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on
the mode by which it was reached.... No better instrument has
been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy
of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to
meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so62important to a popular government, that justice has been
done.'
Justice Frankfurter also noted that "[t]he high social and moral values
inherent in the procedural safeguard of a fair hearing are attested by the
narrowness and rarity of the instances when we have sustained executive
action even though it did not observe the customary standards of procedural fairness."' 6 3
Although Carey is not a standing case, it stands for the proposition
for which it was really cited in Mathews-that the interest in procedurally fair treatment is a public value, and invasion of that interest constitutes injury regardless of the ultimate outcome of the underlying dispute
and regardless of what specific protections the Due Process Clause requires in the particular case.'
160. Id. The portion of the Carey opinion to which the Mathews Court refers includes this
language:
Common law courts traditionally have indicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a
nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for
nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance
to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time
it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to
compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter
or punish malicious deprivation of rights.
Because the right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense that it does
not depend upon the merits of the claimant's substantive assertions, and because of
the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed,... we
believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal
damages without proof of actual injury.
435 U.S. at 266.
161. 341 U.S. 123, 149-74 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 167.
164. Professor Tribe has commented:
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C. The Interest in the Effectiveness of One's Vote
An analysis of cases involving the religion clauses and the right to
vote reveals less evidence of the Court's search for social values corresponding to those constitutional guarantees than in the equal treatment
and procedural due process cases. This is largely because the existence of
a litigant's personal stake in these cases has been assumed for so long.

That infringement of a person's right to vote results in injury has not
been seriously questioned since 1962.165 Perhaps the longstanding assumption of injury in a category of cases is the best evidence that the
invaded interests constitute public values. For example, the Court has
always viewed economic loss as the paradigm injury in fact. Yet, the
Court has never seriously discussed whether the interest in pursuit of
economic well-being reflects a public value. It is a public value simply
because we know it is, despite the argument that there is certainly nothing special about it when compared to other values. 166 If an argument
[T]he right to be heard from, and the right to be told why, are analytically distinct
from the right to secure a different outcome; these rights to interchange express the
elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted
about what is done with one.

L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

503 (1978). See also Mashaw, The Supreme

Court'sDue Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 46-57 (1976). Professor
Michelman has commented in the same vein:
[T]he individual may have various reasons for wanting an opportunity to discuss
the decision with the agent. Some pertain to external consequences: the individual
might succeed in persuading the agent away from the harmful action. But again a
participatory opportunity might also be psychologically important to the individual:
to have played a part in, to have made one's apt contribution to, decisions which are
about oneself may be counted important even if the decision, as it turns out, is the
most unfavorable one imaginable and one's efforts have not proved influential.
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims of ProceduralDue Process, in DuE PROCESS,
NoMos XVIII 127-28 (J. R. PENNOCK & J. W. CHAPMAN, eds. 1977).
The firmly-established public value nature of the interest in procedurally fair treatment
may be reflected by the broad statement made in C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra
note 1: "Failure to comply with procedural requirements of itself establishes sufficient injury
to confer standing. Procedural requirements deserve protection whether or not it can be
shown that the final administrative decision would have been affected." § 3531.4 at 433-34.
The context of this statement is admittedly a discussion of cases involving procedural rights
secured by statute or regulation, some of which were discussed earlier. See, e.g., National
Conservative Political Action Committee v. F.E.C., 626 F.2d 953, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(discussed supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text) and City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d
661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975). Though Wright, Miller and Cooper do not draw upon the due process clause-based cases, the proliferation of procedural rights as a matter of statutory and
regulatory right, when added to the similar explosion of constitutional due process cases, has a
clear "cross-pollination" effect on non-legal public value concepts of procedural fairness. See
supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
165. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
166. Professor Vining puts the interest in economic well-being in perspective in the following manner:
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against recognizing economic loss as injury were made to a court, one
can imagine the impatience of the judge in disposing of it.
The Court's opinion in Baker v. Carr'67 reflects a muted version of
just this sort of impatience with the state's argument that voters have no
real personal stake in the apportionment of the legislature. The Court
responded to this argument by pointing out that the right to vote is secured by the Constitution, and by stating that the plaintiffs "are asserting
'a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of
their votes.' "168 Nevertheless, the Court admitted that "[m]any of the
cases have assumed rather than articulated the premise in deciding the
'
merits of similar claims." 169
Since Baker, reapportionment cases have
continued to assume rather than articulate the injury. 170
Still, Baker presents some textual evidence of the Court searching
beyond legal rights for the relevant public value. The Court appears to
distinguish between a legal interest model and a common law public
value model in its statement that plaintiffs assert "'a plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,'. . . not
merely a claim of 'the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that
the Government be administered according to law .... '.. "I This distinction was carried forward in a slightly more confused way in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 7 2 when the Court observed in a
footnote that "[t]he injury asserted in Baker was ... a concrete injury to
fundamental voting rights, as distinguished from the abstract injury in
nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by respondents as
There is nothing distinctively economic about the interests in survival, growth,
power for its own sake, competitive struggle, or technological advancement represented by what we call economic institutions, nor about the commitment of a life to
automobiles, toys, innkeeping, or any of the other substantive human concerns that
particular business institutions are created to serve. The only economic value is doing what one is trying to do efficiently, choosing among means in such a way as to
maximize the satisfactions of all one's wants. A musician can be as economic as a
venture capitalist. Indeed, money maximizing may not be economic, since the time
and capacities used to maximize money might have been better spent.... Striving,
the value most associated with the business ethic, is decidedly foreign to economics.
As Knight has observed, if the object of a football game is to get the ball over the
goal line, an economist would put all twenty-two men on the same side.
J. VINING, supra note 6, at 157-58.
167. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
168. Id. at 208 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)).
169. Id. at 206.
170. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 253-255. See also C. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 765-802 (1980), and L. TRIBE, supra note 163, at 738-71.
171. 369 U.S. at 208 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,438 (1939); Fairchild v.
Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1911)).
172. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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citizens."' 7 3
The parallel between constitutional tort damages law and injury for
standing purposes, suggested by the Mathews Court's citation of Carey v.
Piphus,174 provides further support for the Court's conclusion that an
interest other than a strictly legal one is implicated in voter's rights cases.
In Carey, the plaintiffs, in addition to their argument for nominal damages, contended that the cases supported a presumption of substantial
damages from violation of a number of constitutional rights, including
procedural due process, even if no proof of actual injury is shown. 7 5
This per se rule for all violations was rejected by the Court, which observed that compensation for "injuries caused by the deprivation of one
constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another.... [T]hese issues must be
considered with reference to the nature of the interests protected by the
particular constitutional right in question."' 76 In reviewing the cases offered in support of the plaintiff's argument, the Court was able to distin-

guish all but those involving interference with the right to vote. Those
cases, the Court conceded, "do appear to support the award of substantial damages simply upon a showing that a plaintiff was wrongfully deprived of the right to vote."' 7 7 To the extent that Carey is relevant to the
existence of noneconomic injury flowing from the denial of procedural
protections, 17 8 this observation in Carey supports a similar proposition
179
vis-a-vis interference with voting rights.
173. Id. at 223 n.13.
174. See supra notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
175. 435 U.S. 247, 260-64 (1978).
176. Id. at 265.
177. Id. at 264 n.22 (citing Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919), and Ashby v.
White, 1 Bro. P. C. 62, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (HL 1703), reversing 2 Ld.Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep.
126 (KB 1703)).
178. See supra notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
179. The Court in Carey drew a distinction between cases in which injury is presumed to
exist (and therefore nominal damages are awardable upon a simple showing of violation) and
cases where plaintiffs are entitled, upon proof, "to recover substantial... damages to compensate them for 'the injury which is "inherent in the nature of the wrong .... '" 435 U.S. at
260-6 1. Included in such compensatory damages subject to proof could well be "real, if intangible, injury." Id. at 261. The Court approvingly described this rule of proved compensatory
damages as applied to procedural due process. "[D]eprivation of protected interests without
procedural due process, even where the premise for the deprivation is not erroneous, inevitably
arouses strong feelings of mental and emotional distress in the individual who is denied this
'feeling of just treatment.'" Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. 123, at
162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Although the Court's discussion of the provable compensatory damages for the "injury
which is 'inherent in the nature of the wrong'" is some recognition of the notion that intangible injury can flow from a violation of procedural due process and is generally helpful in
showing the public value status of injury to an interest in procedurally fair treatment, direct
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d. The Interest in Religious Autonomy
The Establishment Clause cases present a unique opportunity to
view the contrast between the legal interest model and the common law
public value model. This is so because Valley Forge, while explicitly
holding that claims of violations to a "personal constitutional right" secured by the Establishment Clause cannot give rise to injury, also approved the "spiritual stake" injury identified in Abington School District
v. Schempp. l0 Originally, standing in religious freedom cases such as
Schempp and Engel v. Vitale... was considered to be based on a legal
interest model. The injury was to the Establishment Clause legal right to

insist on separation of church and state. The Court in Valley Forge, however, rejected application of this model in Establishment Clause cases,
and felt compelled to recast the injury involved in Schempp in current
standing case terms. The Court stated: "The plaintiffs in Schempp had
standing, not because their complaint rested upon the Establishment
Clause ...but because impressionable school children were subjected to
unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens
1' 2
to avoid them. 1
Why does the Court view exposure to state-sponsored religious exercises as injury? In the absence of the Establishment Clause, one could
argue that such exercises represent a benefit rather than a loss or, at the
very least, are no more "harmful" than any other activities that make up
application of the analogy of constitutional tort damages law to standing injury analysis should
be limited to rights violations that would result in presumed damages. Of course, if the plaintiff alleges compensatory damages, such damages should be awarded and he should have
"standing" to seek them, the injury being the economic value of the damages claimed. See C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER, supra note 1, at § 3531.2, at 397.
In an injunctive case, however, the nature of public value injury cannot be confined to
specific provable past effects on the individual plaintiff. Lyons v. Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95
(1983) (fact that plaintiff was choked in the past pursuant to unconstitutional chokehold practice does not give him standing to pursue injunctive case unless he can show that he will be
choked again in the future). A public value interest is one that is recognized "as an end in
itself." J. VINING, supra note 6, at 174. For example, the Court's recognition of environmental
injury, see supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text, "reveals that the preservation of nature
has been accepted as an end in itself." J. VINING, supra note 6, at 175. Consequently, in
environmental injury cases, "the injury is not the [actual] consequence at the end [of the causation chain] and the person injured is not the individual walking in the park. The injury is
rather the plausibilityof a general impact .... ." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, unless the relevant injury is one that can bepresumedto happen to all who undergo similar treatment, there
is an "absence of any public value to define a class for which the individual [litigant] might
speak." Id. at 61 (emphasis in original). Consequently, only constitutional rights violations in
which injury is presumed will provide an appropriate analogy for standing injury, since it is
only in these cases that a "class" of similarly injured persons can exist.
180. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.22.
181. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
182. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.22.
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the school day. The Court does not answer this question in Valley Forge.
However, since the Court found injury and eschewed reliance on the Establishment Clause, it must have had in mind some public value interest
in avoiding state-sponsored religious indoctrination. It is the invasion of
that interest, not the legal rights secured by the Establishment Clause,
that constitutes injury in fact.
The basis for finding this public value interest is not disclosed in the
Court's brief footnote discussion of Schempp. "3 However, the history of
and fundamental assumptions underlying a constitutional guarantee-as
carried forward by the Court's opinions-are evidence of public value
184
interests at stake.
Recently, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 85 the Court spoke broadly of the
"elementary proposition" of religious autonomy underlying the First
Amendment: "As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance
with the dictates of his own conscience."186 When action abridging the
guarantees of the First Amendment takes place, the state "'invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit' "-the interest unifying the various freedoms in the First Amendment. 8 7 That this invasion can cause cognizable injury was recognized by the Court in Engel v. Vitale, 8 8 quoted with
approval in Wallace: "When the power, prestige and financial support of
the government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain."18 9
Though there is much dispute on precisely where the wall of separa183. Id.
184. See supra notes 157-163, 176-179 and accompanying text. As Nas the case with the
interest in procedurally fair treatment and voting, there is some support from constitutional
tort law for the public value status of the interest in religious autonomy. Recently, the Tenth
Circuit relied upon Carey and the voting rights cases cited therein, see supra note 177 and
accompanying text, to find it proper for a federal court to award substantialpresumed damages
for violations of plaintiffs' establishment clause rights in a case involving school sponsored
religious meetings. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (0th Cir. 1985). See
also Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) (presumed damages for an unlawful
arrest).

185. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
186. Id. at 2486.
187. Id. at 2487 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977), Board of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). In Wooley, though, sufficient injury for standing purposes was provided by previous and threatened future prosecutions of the plaintiff for defacing
his license plate by covering the motto "Live free or die." 430 U.S. at 710. See infra notes
214-215 and accompanying text.
188. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
189. 105 S. Ct. at 2492 n.51 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 431).
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tion between church and state should be located,19 "[c]ompulsory attendance upon religious exercises went out early in the process of
separating church and state, together with forced observance of religious
forms and ceremonies." 19' 1 The origins of this early development of First
Amendment law are traced to Virginia's "Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom," a forerunner to the First Amendment to the Constitution. 192
This document states in relevant part: "We, the General Assembly, do
enact, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, re-

strained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall
otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief....,,,93
These sources suggest that there is a more than adequate basis for saying
that compelled exposure to state-sponsored religious exercises implicates
our shared sense of harm, even apart from the strict legal commands of

the Establishment Clause. 194

The injury to the taxpayer occasioned in cases of governmental support of religion also has not been explicitly recast by the Court in postCamp injury in fact terms. However, the use of one's tax money-the
payment of which is no less compulsory than is public school attendance

for "impressionable" school children-seems only a slightly removed
form of "unwelcome religious exercise."195 The First Amendment Establishment Clause was directed at precisely this religious exercise of
compulsory tithes. 96 If "financial support of government . . . placed

behind a particular religious belief" results in at least "indirect coercive
190. See, eg., Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2496-505 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing how
even mandatory moment of silence laws would not violate the First Amendment).
191. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 44 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 28-29.
193. Id at 28 (quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 12 HENING'S STATUTES
OF VIRGINIA 84 (1823)). See also Everson, 330 U.S. at 13; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 503
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
194. Whether the "true" historical record discloses that the First Amendment was intended only to prohibit favoring one religion over another, see Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2508-20
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), or to erect a complete "wall of separation between church and
State," Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), does not matter as much as the fact
that it is widely assumed, in part based upon the long line of cases following the Reynolds
notion, that state-sponsored religious exercises of any kind constitute coercion.
195. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22.
196. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 40-41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); id. at 8-13; Reynolds, 98 U.S.
at 162-63. See also supra text accompanying notes 181-182. Justice Rutledge summed up
James Madison's views:
Madison and his coworkers made no exceptions or abridgements to the complete separation [between church and state] they created. Their objection was not to
small tithes. It was to any tithes whatsoever. 'If it were lawful to impose a small tax
for religion, the admission would pave the way for oppressive levies.' Not the
amount but 'the principle of the assessment was wrong.'
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pressure upon religious minorities to conform,"' 19 7 then use of a taxpayer's compulsorily extracted taxes to sponsor religious activities compels conformity to a tithe system. The coercion of the taxpayer, and thus
the violation of his interest in religious autonomy, is complete upon the
government's payment of his tax money to fund religious activities. This
explanation for taxpayer standing places it in conformity both with the
post-Camp injury in fact concept and with the injury to the interest in
religious autonomy represented by Schempp and Wallace. "I
2. ConstitutionalProvisionsfor Which No Corresponding Public Value
Interests Have Been Recognized
The findings of injury in the above cases stand in stark contrast to
United States v. Richardson1 99 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, °00 where no injury was found. In those two cases, the
Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that allegations of violation of their
constitutional rights was sufficient injury for standing purposes. After
rejecting the legal injury model, however, the Court searched unsuccessfully for other injury in fact. It acknowledged that the "categories of
judicially cognizable injury were . . . broadened" by the Camp decision,2 0 and mentioned the intangible non-economic injury to environmental interests present in United States v. SCRAP 02z and the "injury to
fundamental voting rights" present in Baker v. Carr.3 However, the
Court failed to identify any interests with public value status corresponding to the Statement and Accounts Clause and the Incompatibility
Clause.
It is significant that the plaintiffs in both Richardson and Reservists
attempted to identify public value interests corresponding to their constiEverson, 330 U.S. at 41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF
105 (1910)).
197. Wallace 105 S. Ct. at 2492 n.51 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 431).
198. This theory of taxpayer standing, as upheld in Flast, also accounts for situations in
which, instead of a cash payment, the government grants a tax exemption, see Walz v. Tax
Comm., 397 U.S. 664 (1970), or makes an in-kind donation of surplus property, see Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In both of those situations, there would not be a "personal" injury
to a taxpayer interest in religious autonomy (which exists by reason of their stake in the funds
in the public treasury) because tax exemptions and transfers of surplus property do not involve
a drain on monies paid into the treasury as do cash subsidies. See infra notes 237-242 and
accompanying text.
199. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
200. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
201. Id at 218.
202. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
203. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Reservists, 418 U.S. at 223 n.13 and Richardson, 418 U.S. at
179-80.
CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA
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tutional rights. In Richardson, the plaintiff claimed that "without detailed information on CIA expenditures-and hence its activities-he
[could not] intelligently follow the actions of Congress or the Executive,
nor [could] he properly fulfill his [voting] obligations as a member of the
electorate.""z In Reservists, attempts to identify the public value interests are found in the dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas, citing Alexander Hamilton, found that "the Incompatability Clause had a specific
purpose: to avoid 'the danger of executive influence upon the legislative
body' "20 and that the plaintiff's complaint "alleges injuries to the ability
of the average citizen to make his political advocacy effective whenever it
touches upon the vast interests of the Pentagon."2 °6 Justice Marshall
more specifically pointed to the purposes of the organization to which
plaintiffs belonged-"to persuade the Congress of the United States and
all members of the Congress to take all steps necessary and appropriate"
to end the Vietnam War-and identified as a "judicially cognizable interest" their "right ... to have their arguments considered by Congressmen
not subject to a conflict 2of
interest by virtue of their position in the
07
Armed Forces Reserves.
Although the Statement and Accounts Clause and Incompatibility
Clause were deemed important enough requirements that the Framers
saw fit to place them in the Constitution, the Court's decision that the
injury occasioned by their breach were "abstract" or "generalized"
stands as a failure or refusal to recognize the values reflected by the
Clauses as "trait[s] and motive[s] of behavior widely enough shared" to
constitute public values.20 8 In short, the clauses impose mere "technical" requirements, but do not correspond with core substantive values
alive in society's intuitive value system. 0 9
204. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176.
205. Reservists, 418 U.S. at 232 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 233.
207. Id. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. J. VINING, supra note 6, at 61. See supra note 27. See also supra notes 42-46 and
accompanying text, discussing the treatment of the injury to Does in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
209. Just as there are technical constitutional requirements, there are similarly technical
statutory and regulatory rights with respect to which no corresponding public value interest
can be identified. See supra notes 44-48, 56-58, 70-71 and accompanying text. The difference
between technical statutory and regulatory rights and technical constitutional guarantees, of
course, is that the former may establish a predicate for injury to the legal interest secured while
the latter may not. Compare supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text with supra notes 74-86
and accompanying text. This distinction between technical statutory requirements and techni-

cal constitutional ones is explicitly recognized by footnote statements in both Richardson and
Reservists opinions. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 n.8, and Reservists, 418 U.S. at 224 n.14
(There is "no doubt that if the Congress enacted the statute creating such a legal right, the
requisite injury for standing would be found in an invasion of that right."). One could well
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Without necessarily approving of the Court's determination, it is admittedly hard to conjure up the same intuitive sense of injury in Reservists and Richardson that one feels when there is a discriminatory denial of
public benefits, a failure to provide a hearing, a compelled exposure to

state-sponsored religious exercises, or an interference with one's vote.
The difference between the decisions clearly is not the legal commands of
the constitutional provisions-all are stated in strong terms-but the
Court's assessment of society's "sympathy with and understanding of the
loss[es]" occasioned by the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. 210 It is
this perception of loss that governs and not the legal requirements of the
particular constitutional provision involved.2 11
3.

Public Value Interests Correspondingto Other ConstitutionalProvisions

The four constitutional areas discussed in Part III.A.1 above were
selected because the cases demonstrate that the Court has recognized the
intangible public value interests involved. One might well ask, however,
why the Court has not found similarly cognizable interests corresponding
to other constitutional guarantees of apparently equal social importance.
The reason can be found in the fact that often the Court can sustain
standing on some more familiar basis, thereby making it unnecessary to
reach the question of what intangible interests may be implicated by the

alleged constitutional violation.2 12 In most cases there are public value
argue that, given the cross-pollination that occurs between statutory policy and public values,
see supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text, the Court, by excluding any consideration of
conflict of interest and freedom of information statutes analogous to the constitutional provisions involved, took an overly narrow view of the impact of statutory policy on the public
value adjudication process. Cf Note, Informational Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 79
COLUM. L. Rv. 366 (1979) and Scientists' Inst. for Public Information v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir 1973) (finding injury to informational interests).
210. J. VINING, supra note 6, at 177.
211. The common law public value theory of injury in constitutional cases could be criticized as establishing a "hierarchy of constitutional values." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484. See
supra text accompanying notes 86 and 119. Upon closer examination, however, this objection
is unwarranted. The public value interest model adjudicates injury according to a societal
value system which exists largely independently of legal rights secured by the law. Some constitutional provisions reflect and have a profound impact upon basic values shared by society,
while others do not. Where public value interests correspond with the constitutional guarantees, the Court will find injury. Where they do not correspond, the Court will not find injury.
Thus, there is no problem with a hierarchy of constitutional rights. There is simply a problem
of ascertaining which challenged government action invades public value interests and which
does not. This is the identical inquiry that must be made to determine standing in all other
instances when no statutory legal right can be relied upon. See supra notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
212. Not coincidentally, the presence of a more tangible and familiar public value interest
has retarded the growth of the statutory legal interest model as well. Thus, both the statutory
legal interest model and the consitutional public value model have devcloped from the same
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interests invaded other than the intangible ones corresponding to the
constitutional right involved. For example, Fourth Amendment cases
generally involve actual or threatened injury beyond simple violation of
the constitutional right. Doors are broken and premises and people
searched, thereby implicating well settled notions of property and privacy,"1 3 and criminal proceedings may be brought, implicating economic
and liberty interests.2 " 4 In a First Amendment speech case, the litigant is
thereby
often subject to a possible fine or imprisonment or loss of a 21job,
5
invading widely shared values of liberty and economic loss.
Although the Court generally predicates standing injury in such

cases on a more familiar basis than the intangible constitutional public
value interest, one can imagine First and Fourth Amendment cases
where this solution would not work. By varying the facts of the Fourth
Amendment and First Amendment examples above to remove the more
tangible interests, and by assuming the plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief, we can see how the need to search for intangible public value interests might arise.2 16 For example, what is the nature of the injury when
exigencies: cases in which a public value interest can be identified but is ineligible to form a
predicate for injury because of the redressability requirement and cases in which no more
tangible and cases in which familiar public value interest can be identified at all. See supra
Part IIA (ineligible injury) and Part IIB (non-existent injury).
213. The line between "tangible" and "intangible" injury occasioned by such a search, and
the presumed greater importance of the tangible over the intangible injury, is not so clear.
Presumably the most "tangible" injury is the broken door, which costs money to repair. Yet,
certainly a person subject to a "no- knock" search where police break down his door and rush
in, would not focus upon the cost of repairing the door as the "true" injury, even if the police
do nothing else. Fear, shock, surprise, humiliation, and embarrassment are more likely to be
emphasized. In addition, many of these so-called intangible effects are closely tied up with
intuitive concepts of security of property and person. These concepts, in turn, have shaped the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, see infra note 217, which in turn has continued to
shape those intuitive values. Undoubtedly the relationship between constitutional provisions
and public values is equally as complex as the relationship between federal statutes and public
values. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
214. In Rakus v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court held that when authorities seek to
introduce seized evidence and the criminal defendant moves to suppress, the only issue is
whether there was a search that violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and there
is no separate "standing" issue. Id. at 133-40. As the Court observed, "[tihere is no reason to
think that a party whose rights have been infringed will not, if the evidence is used against him,
have ample motivation to suppress it." Id. at 134. The threatened use of the evidence obtained
in criminal proceedings is sufficient injury for standing purposes.
215. See, eg., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Cf Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169 (1972) (use of campus facilities denied).
216. A plaintiff seeking money damages has alleged economic injury and therefore need not
rely on any other injury to pursue that claim. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER,

supra note 1,at § 3531.2, at 397 ("Once it is concluded that the plaintiff has stated valid claims
for damages, there can be no question of standing."). Cf Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
109 (1983) (economic loss from past violations will not provide standing to pursue injuctive
relief absent a showing that the past illegal conduct will happen again).
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the police threaten to engage in surveillance that involves no physical
contact or intrusion, such as videotaping a garden party from a distance
by high-powered camera and long-distance microphone? What is the injury to a would-be speaker of unpopular views if he is denied a permit to
deliver his speech in a city park?
The injuries in these situations, if they exist, cannot be found in the
alleged violation of any legal rights secured by the constitutional provisions involved, because the Court has rejected application of a legal interest injury analysis model to constitutional rights. Rather, a court would
need to find a public value interest in living one's life free of governmental surveillance and in expressing one's views publicly without governmental interference. As the discussion of the four areas where the Court
has already recognized constitutional public value interests indicates, the
history and purpose-as well as the commands--of the relevant constitutional provisions would figure prominently in this determination. The
relevance of this data, however, is not to flesh out the legal limitations
upon the government in each situation. Whether the legal limitations of
the Fourth and First Amendments are transgressed by the challenged
government action is a different question from whether a plaintiff has
alleged injury. The relevance of the constitutional data is to gauge how
well we have incorporated the interests at stake into our public value
system. If we have-and we thus have sympathy for and understanding
2 17
of the litigant's loss in each situation-there is injury.
217. Fourth Amendment cases outside the criminal proceeding context are unusual, because there may be a "double" public value interest analysis: one to determine standing and
one to determine whether there was a search. Under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), the question of whether there is a search depends upon whether the person had a
"legitimate expectation of privacy." As the Court noted in Rakus v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978), "[llegitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Id. at 143 n. 12. See also Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (issue is whether the expectation is
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' ").
In the criminal proceeding context, sufficient "injury" is shown by the threatened introduction into evidence of the alleged illegal fruits of the search. See supra note 214. In a suit
for money damages, there is no question of standing. See supra note 216. In a suit for an
injunction, however, standing injury of the kind discussed here must be shown. This will
involve determining whether the interest invaded by the alleged illegal conduct can be stated in
terms of a public value. This determination, like the determination of whether there is a
search, will need to be made "by reference to" the very same "concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." If the salient
issue is whether there is a search (as opposed to whether, given a search, the search was reasonable), injunctive actions raising this issue may be the only cases where the issues of standing
and the merits will amount to the same thing. Cf Rakus v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (in
Fourth Amendment suppression cases, there is no separate issue of standing).
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B. Deciding When the Litigant Is Personally Affected with Regard to
the Invaded Public Value Interests
Arguing that the Court has held that at least four intangible interests which correspond to constitutional provisions represent public values, solves only half the problem. The question remains under what
circumstances the Court should recognize that the challenged action invades those interests. In traditional standing terms, "the 'injury in fact'
test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that
2z1
the party seeking review be himself among the injured.
Several cases allude to this problem. The Court in Mathews recognized that discrimination "can cause serious non-economic injury to
those persons who are personally denied equal treatment, 21 9 and concluded that the requirement was met by Mr. Mathews. Valley Forge distinguished Abington School District v. Schempp by noting that the
"impressionable" school children in Schempp were personally "subjected
to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them."'22 In Baker v. Carr, the Court described the plaintiffs' interest in their votes as "plain" and "direct." '
In determining that the litigant asserting intangible interests corresponding to constitutional guarantees is personally affected, the Court is,
of course, not writing on a clean slate. It has already held that intangible
non-constitutional interests can form a basis for injury. And it has indicated how the public value adjudication process operates not only to determine that the interests at stake represent public values, but also to
2' 2 2
determine when those cognizable interests are "at stake.
218. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
219. 104 S.Ct. at 1395 (emphasis added). See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3327
(1984).
220. 454 U.S. at 486 n.22.
221. 369 U.S. at 208 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 438).
222. Professor Vining has argued that when a court declines to find injury for standing
purposes, there are two possible bases for its decision: "Either what [the litigant] represents is
not a public value. Or he does not represent thepublic value he claims to represent: it is not part

of him." J. VINING, supra note 6, at 171 (emphasis added). See United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (standing may not be a vehicle to vindicate the interests of "concerned
bystanders"). It is, of course, possible to have standing to assert the rights of third persons.
See, e.g., Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The third party standing
bar has been considerably relaxed in recent years. See Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984); Rohr, Fightingfor the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of
Third-PartyStanding and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.393 (1981).
Before third party standing is possible, however, the plaintiff must meet the Article III thresh-

old "price of admission" to federal court-personal injury of some kind.
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In an economic interests case, the task of determining whether those
interests are invaded is relatively easy. We simply determine if the litigant will lose money as a result of the challenged action. For
noneconomic intangible interests there is no such certain test. We could
accept the person's allegation that he feels his interest is invaded, possibly supported by corroborating evidence of subjective effect, but this is
fraught with the difficulty of allowing standing to practically anyone. A
more objective measure is needed. For a court to say that there is injury,
the litigant's relationship to the admittedly cognizable interest must be
such that we have "sympathy with and understand" ' 3 how a person in
that position would justifiably feel "personal loss." Just as the first question of the public value status of the interest is whether it is a "trait and
motive of behavior widely enough shared to permit us to recognize it as a
social role," '24 the question of whether there is personal injury to that
interest depends upon whether there is some basis in our shared sense of
what it means to have "personal loss" in terms of that interest. 2 5
The cases involving intangible harm not surprisingly require the litigant to show concrete circumstances under which a court would be willing to say that a reasonable person in the litigant's position would
experience the intangible harm claimed. The Court in Sierra Club v.
Morton held that the challenged construction of a highway and other
improvements by the Disney company in the national park area could
223. J. VINING, supra note 6, at 177.
224. Id. at 161.
225. See id. at 60:
In an administrative case a 'real' individual is there as a representative of the
class of which he is a member, pursuing its interests, its purposes, its values. Only as
such can we 'see' him, is he there.
But note that he only says he is a member of the class. We are entitled to ask...
is he really a member of that class? Are its interests and values his interests?... And
this we do in double fashion, by deciding first, of course, what is the class or the set of
values that defines it, and second, what connection this individual has to it.
Much of our analysis takes place as we answer the question: Is he harmed?
Suppose an individual plaintiff comes into court. He identifies himself by nameJohn Jones. The court says, we all say, 'That is not important except for purposes of
convenient reference. Who are you?' Let us assume he replies, 'I am appearing as a
parent, in my role as child raiser. I challenge this administrative decision as such.'
On further questioning we learn that he has no children and never has had. We may
then say, 'You are not harmed,' by which we mean we do not recognize him as part
of the class for which he purports to speak... any more than a manufacturing
corporation is authorized to speak for particular religious interests.
If the challenger does have children, we then ask, 'How is your role involved in
this case?' If he answers that the administrative decision, say a new customs regulation, makes it too difficult to obtain chemicals to make psychedelic drugs for his own
use (which let us assume has not yet been specifically prohibited) we might, at this
point in history, say again, 'You are not harmed,' by which we would mean that we
do not recognize the value he is seeking to vindicate or the interest he is seeking to
protect as a value and interest of a parent.
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impair a person's aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests.2 26
The Sierra Club members, however, were not "among the injured" because they failed to allege that any of them hiked or camped in the
area.22 7 Rather, the Club relied on injury to its members as experts on
and advocates of aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests. In
the Court's view, if impact upon experts on and advocates of particular

interests were counted as "personally" affecting those interests, injury
would have no objective measure, since anyone claiming expertise and
belief in those interests could establish injury.22 ' What was required,
then, was that the litigant personally engage in what society would consider activity of persons truly representing those interests. Unless mem-

bers could show concrete activity expressive of their aesthetic,
conservational, or recreational interests, their claim of intangible injury
would not be recognized.229
The requirement that the litigant show that he is personally affected

from injury to intangible interests corresponding to constitutional guarantees is illuminated by two cases-Valley Forge and Allen v. Wright.2"'
In Valley Forge, the interest involved was that of religious autonomy; in

Allen it was the interest in equal treatment. In both cases, the Court,
while recognizing the existence of the relevant intangible public value
interest, rejected each litigant's claim of personal injury with respect to
that interest.
In Valley Forge, the Court acknowledged that a person has a cognizable "spiritual stake" in religious autonomy. 231 The Valley Forge plain-

tiffs, however, could not rely on that interest because they were unable to
show they were personally affected by the actions of the government impinging on that interest. In the paragraph disposing of the "spiritual
226. 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
227. Id. at 735.
228. Id. at 739-40:
The Sierra Club is a large and long-established organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of protecting our Nation's natural heritage from man's depredations. But if a 'special interest' in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra Club
to commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon which
to disallow a suit by any other bona fide 'special interest' organization, however small
or short-lived. And if any group with a bona fide 'special interest' could initiate such
litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide
special interest would not also be entitled to do so.
229. Camping and hiking by Club members were not the only concrete activites that could
have led to standing for the Club. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8 (suggesting that not
only use of the parkland by members, but also camping trips conducted by the Club itself
would be a sufficient predicate for injury); Burnham, supra note 3, at 194-95 (finding direct
standing for the Club without any need to rely upon member activities).
230. 104 S.Ct. 3315 (1984).
231. See supra notes 180-194 and accompanying text.
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stake" argument, the Court distinguished Schempp, in which the plaintiff
school children were personally exposed to "unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them," '3 2 and
indicated that the Valley Forge plaintiffs were not in an analogous position vis-a-vis the interest claimed: "Respondents complain of a transfer
of property located in Chester County, Pa. The named plaintiffs reside in
Maryland and Virginia; their organizational headquarters are located in
Washington, D.C. They learned of the transfer [of the surplus property
to The Assemblies of God] through a news release." '33 Although the
interest in religious autonomy is a proper public value, the Valley Forge
plaintiffs "fail[ed] to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a
consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees." ' 34
In Valley Forge, any claim of injury analogous to Schempp was destined to be undercut by the plaintiffs' focus on the transfer of the property rather than its use by a religious organization. 235 In cases similar to
Schempp, it is the plaintiff's exposure to government-sponsored religious
236
activity that creates the injury to the interest in religious autonomy.
Another basis for alleging injury to the interest in religious autonomy-focusing on the transfer of property-is the post-Camp version of
Flast taxpayer standing.23 7 Flast taxpayer standing, recast in injury in
fact terms, lies in the exposure of the taxpayer to the "unwelcome religious exercise" of tithes in support of religious activity. In a direct subsidy case, the taxpayer is forced to contribute to the treasury and the
burden on the treasury caused by payment therefrom to a religious institution amounts to the exaction of a tithe. Although payment of money
and its use by the government form the basis of injury, the injury is to the
taxpayer's noneconomic interest in religious autonomy. However, the
taxpayer's relationship to direct cash subsidies, on the one hand, and the
tax exemptions and the donation of surplus government property in Valley Forge, on the other, are different. Tax exemptions are qualitatively
different from compulsory tithes since they do not place any burden on
232. 454 U.S. at 486 n.22.
233. Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted).
234. Id. at 485 (emphasis by the Court).
235. This focus on the transfer is understandable since the Valley Forge plaintiffs primarily
sought standing as taxpayers. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 476 ("The injury alleged by respondents in their amended complaint is the 'depriv[ation] of the fair and constitutional use of
[their] tax dollar.' ").
236. See infra notes 237-242 and accompanying text for treatment of possible injury to
taxpayers arising out of the transfer of the property.
237. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
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the taxpayers' dollars in the treasury and thus do not "compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves." 23 Justice Brennan, concurring in Walz v. Tax Commission,
distinguished tax exemptions from cash subsidies involved in cases such
as Flast:
A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the
subsidized enterprise and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as
a whole. An exemption, on the other hand, involves no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise only passively, by relieving a
privately funded venture of the burden of paying taxes. In other
words, '[i]n the case of direct subsidy, the state forcibly diverts the
income of both believers and nonbelievers to churches,' while '[i]n
the case of an exemption, the state merely refrains from diverting
to its own uses income independently generated by the churches
through voluntary contributions. '239
Property donations, such as in Valley Forge, are more difficult to
distinguish from compulsory tithes because they seem less passive than
tax exemptions. However, Valley Forge indicates that, at least with respect to the donation of surplus property, there is a qualitative difference.
This should be so particularly when, despite the obvious benefit to the
religious group, the transfer of that property represents no burden on
taxpayers and may in fact result in a benefit to them. The Valley Forge
Court discussed this aspect of the transfer issue in a footnote, opining in
dictum that "any connection between the challenged property transfer
and respondents' tax burden is at best speculative and at worst nonexistent. ' ' 2

°

The Court explained:

[R]espondents [do not] dispute the Government's conclusion
that the property has become useless for federal purposes and
ought to be disposed of in some productive manner ....

[E]ach

year of delay in disposing of the property depleted the Treasury by
the amounts necessary to maintain a facility that had lost its value
to the Government. 24 1
Thus, the plaintiffs in Valley Forge did not have standing even under a
revised post-Camp definition because, although invasion of the interest in
religious autonomy is a cognizable injury, they were not, as taxpayers,
personally injured in the absence of a demonstrable drain on their tax
238. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (Preamble), 12 HENING'S STATUTES OF
VIRGINIA 84 (1823), quoted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) and Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
239. 397 U.S. 664, 690-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
240. 454 U.S. at 480 n.17.
241. Id.
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dollars as a result of the government action. 242

Allen v. Wright 243 rejects a claim of injury to the interest in equal
treatment for reasons similar to those involved in Valley Forge. In Allen,
the parents of public school students challenged the legality of certain
IRS guidelines. These guidelines were used to insure compliance with
IRS requirements that private schools not discriminate on grounds of
race in their admissions process. As injury, plaintiffs claimed" 'the denigration they suffer as black parents and schoolchildren when their government graces with tax-exempt status educational institutions in their

communities that treat members of their race as persons of lesser
worth.' "2'

The Court understood the plaintiffs to allege, inter alia,

"stigmatic" injury to their right to equal treatment.245
The Allen Court reiterated the view set forth in Heckler v. Mathews,246 that the stigmatizing injury to the equal treatment interest
"often caused by racial discrimination . . . is one of the most serious
consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in
some circumstances to support standing."'24 7 Nonetheless, the Court denied standing because the plaintiffs had "not allege[d] a stigmatic injury
suffered as a direct result of having personally been denied equal treatment.""2 4 The plaintiffs in Allen had never applied for (nor were they
242. This explanation also accounts for the result in Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
429 (1952). In Doremus, plaintiffs brought suit in part as taxpayers, claiming that a New
Jersey law which authorized public school teachers to read passages from the Bible in the
classroom violated the Establishment Clause. The Court denied taxpayer standing. Consistent with the theory posited here, there would be no taxpayer standing in Doremus for the
same reason given when tax exemptions and transfers of surplus property are involved-there
is no extra drain of money from the treasury when teachers teach religion rather than math.
Cf Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3221 n.5 (1985) (state taxpayers have
standing to challenge "shared time" public instruction in sectarian schools).
Clearly, some property donations could be said to "personally" injure taxpayers' interest
in religious autonomy. For example, if the government were to construct buildings and then
give them to religious organizations immediately, the drain on the treasury would be identifiable and would be the same as in the case of a direct subsidy to build those buildings. See
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (taxpayer challenge to federal statute providing construction grants for
buildings limited to sectarian use for 20 years)).
243. 104 S.Ct. 3315 (1984).
244. Id. at 3324 (quoting Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
245. 104 S.Ct.at 3327.
246. 465 U.S. 728.
247. 104 S.Ct. at 3327.
248. Id. Plaintiffs' membership in the racial group generally affected by the challenged
government policies was an insufficient basis for injury. As the Court in Allen explained:
The consequences of recognizing respondents' standing on the basis of their first
claim of injury illustrate why our cases plainly hold that such injury is not judicially
cognizable. If the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would extend
nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups against xhich the govern-
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interested in applying for) admission to any of the private schools in
question. The plaintiffs also failed to allege that "there were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in respondents' communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an
appreciable difference in public-school integration."'24 9 Presumably, had
they made these allegations, they would have shown that they were "personally subject to discriminatory treatment" by the IRS guidelines.2 5
On the positive side of the personally-affected question, the Court in
Allen recognized, as has been argued here, that "personal" injury to the
intangible interests corresponding to a constitutional guarantee "requires
identification of some concrete interest with respect to which [the litigant
is] personally subject to" invasion of the intangible interest. The Court
portrayed Mathews as a case satisfying this requirement. 2 51 Examination
ment was alleged to be discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially
discriminatory school, regardless of the location of that school. All such persons
could claim the same sort of abstract stigmatic injury respondents assert in their first
claim of injury. A black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school in Maine. Recognition of standing in such
circumstances would transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehicle for the
vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.'
104 S. Ct. at 3327 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687). Cf Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 483 (disallowing as a basis for standing the premise that plaintiffs sued as
"separationists").
249. 104 S. Ct. at 3328.
250. The Court described the injury as "not sufficient for standing in the abstract form in
104 S. Ct. at 3328 n.22. The term "abstract" was
which [plaintiffs'] complaint asserts it ....
used to describe the problem with the injury alleged in Reservists, 418 U.S. at 227, and may be
the term chosen by the court to indicate lack of personal injury with respect to an admittedly
cognizable interest. This suggests that Reservists may not have been decided on the ground
that the interest in lobbying Congressmen free of conflicts of interest is not a public value, see
supra notes 199-211 and accompanying text, but rather on the ground that the plaintiffs in
Reservists did not allege facts that showed they were personally affected with respect to that
interest. Even the more specific characterizations of their lobbying interests alluded to by
Justices Marshall and Douglas in dissent fail to mention any particular legislation with respect
to which the lobbying efforts had been thwarted, or even that they were engaged in such efforts
with respect to any particular legislation. Richardsoncannot be explained in this way since the
plaintiff there had requested the specific information for which he ultimately sued. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 168-69. This perhaps explains why Justice Stewart dissented in Richardson, but not in Reservists. See Reservists, 418 U.S. at 228-29 (Stewart, J., concurring)
("Standing is not today found wanting [in Reservists] because an injury has been suffered by
many, but rather because none of the respondents has alleged the sort of direct, palpable injury
required for standing under Art. III.").
251. 104 S. Ct. at 3328 n.22. The language following that quoted above, however, creates
a potential ambiguity. The Court goes on to say that "[the concrete] interest must independently satisfy the causation requirement of the standing doctrine," and describes Mathews as a
case in which the "causation component.., was satisfied with respect to the claimed [Social
Security] benefits." Id. There are two ways of reading the Court's reference to the "causation
requirement of standing doctrine." If "concrete interest" refers to a tangible interest with
clear public value status on its own and "causation requirement" refers to both the "fairly
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of the facts of Mathews shows that this is a correct portrayal. In Ma-

thews, the plaintiff was personally denied equal treatment because he applied for and was denied Social Security benefits because of the very
statutory classification that he challenged. It would not have been
enough that he was able to show-in parallel fashion to the facts ofAllen
v. Wright-that he was a member of the general group that was affected
by the discriminatory pension offset provision, i.e., a male insured person
over 65 receiving pensions from some other source.25 z
In the reapportionment cases, the plaintiffs were personally affected
because they were voters residing in the more populous counties that
were disfavored by the challenged apportionment system.25 3 This is not
to suggest that vote dilution might not also personally affect others, such
as candidates for public office,2 54 or persons similarly affected in a concrete way by district line-drawing or the lack thereof.25 5 However, if the
traceable" and redressability requirements, then the intangible noneconomic injury corresponding to the constitutional guarantee is irrelevant to the standing issue. If plaintiffs are able
to show injury to a different, concrete and tangible public value interest that satisfies all the
standing requirements, then standing exists without any need to inquire into any less tangible
interests involved. See supra notes 212-215 and accompanying text. Because footnote 22 in
Allen describes Mathews as a case in which the "causation component... was satisfied with
respect to the claimed [Social Security] benefits," 104 S.Ct. at 3328 n.22, and the redressability
requirement clearly was not met with respect to Mathews' interest in the claimed benefits, the
footnote must be taken as a simple reiteration of the circumstances required for a showing that
an intangible interest is "personally affected." Under this reading, no violence is done to the
unanimous opinion in Mathews and the footnote reference to "causation requirement of standing doctrine" is simply a restatement of what the Court has always required in cases involving
claims of intangible injury. See supra notes 222-229 and accompanying text.
There is, in addition, some general definitional support for the view that the Court's use of
the term "causation requirement" in Allen could have referred only to the "fairly traceable"
requirement and not to redressability. See supra note 1 (the Court's reference to causation
sometimes includes redressability and sometimes does not). In this respect, it is noteworthy
that earlier in the opinion in Allen, the Court separated the two, framing them in the form of
two distinct questions: "Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury too
attenuated? Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling
too speculative?" 104 S.Ct. at 3325. But cf id. at 3326 n.19 and 3329 n.24.
252. Similarly, in the due process driver's license hypothetical set forth supra text accompanying notes 111-112, the plaintiff had applied for and been denied a license without statement of reasons or opportunity for a hearing. Allegations that the plaintiff was over 16, knew
how to drive, and met all the requirements for a license would not have been sufficient to show
personal injury to the interest in procedurally fair treatment.
253. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.186, 204-05, 207-08 (1962), and cases cited id. at 207 n.28.
See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
540 (1964).
254. See, e.g., MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 282 (1948) (concerning the" 'Progressives Party' and its nominees for United States Senator, Presidential Electors and State
offices").
255. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, (1980) (at large city commission election
system challenged by black voters for diluting black voting strength).
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litigants are not voters or are not members of the group of voters that has
been allegedly undercounted by the existing apportionment, their intangible interest in their vote would not be deemed to be personally affected
by malapportionment. They would not be "asserting 'a plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes'" but
"merely ... claim[ing] . . 'the right possessed by every citizen to require
"1256
that the Government be administered according to law ....

IV.

Problems and Issues in Common Law Public Value Injury
Adjudication

The Court's recognition that public values corresponding to core
constitutional principles can provide a predicate for injury is an important development which should serve to expand standing in "constitutional injury" cases. Yet it is a simple and modest application of the
injury in fact doctrine of Data Processing Organizations v. Camp. No
longer is it necessary to show that one's interest is protected by the positive law; it is sufficient that the interest represented by the litigant be
recognized as a public value. The cases discussed in Part III.A demonstrate that, like environmental and economic well-being, certain core
principles reflected in the Constitution are "important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society."2'57 However, if common law public value
256. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 208. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), is another example
of lack of injury based upon failure of plaintiffs to show that they represented the public value
interest. In Laird,plaintiffs claimed their First Amendment rights "were being invaded by the
Department of the Army's alleged 'surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity.'" Id. at 2. Army Intelligence had established a data gathering system "consist[ing] ... of
the collection of information about public activities that were thought to have at least some
potential for civil disorder." Id. at 6. Plaintiffs claimed that the existence of that system "exercise[d] a present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization of their First
Amendment rights." Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). The Court phrased the issue as "whether
the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of [an
allegedly illegal] governmental investigative and data-gathering activity." Id. The Court acknowledged that a government action could be challenged "even though it has only an indirect
effect" on First Amendment rights. Id. at 12-13. Thus, the Court was acknowledging that the
interest in free political expression is a public value. See also supra notes 212-217 and accompanying text. However, the Court held that "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm." Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14. Further, because plaintiffs counsel "admitted that his clients
were 'not people, obviously, who are cowed and chilled,'" they "clearly lack that 'personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' essential to standing." Id. at 13 n.7. See also id. at 8
n.5. A parallel between Laird,Allen and Valley Forge exists. In all three cases the plaintiffs
claimed injury based solely on their membership in the general group which the illegal activity
offended: in Lairdit was civilians, in Allen it was blacks, and in Valley Forgeit was separationists. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
257. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734.
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injury adjudication is to avoid the problems of inconsistency and confusion to which standing generally has been heir, some clarification of the
purpose of the injury requirement and the overall process of public value
adjudication is needed.
Two strands of reasoning concerning the purpose of the injury requirement emerge from the cases, neither of which is completely satisfactory. One often repeated statement is that injury guarantees that the
litigant has a "personal stake"2'58 in the controversy sufficient to assure
an incentive to litigate vigorously and responsibly. In this vein, the
Court has held that "[t]he requirement of 'actual injury redressable by
the court' . . . tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation
of the consequences of judicial action."2'59 As the Court observed in Valley Forge, "the requirement that a party seeking review must allege facts
showing that he is himself adversely affected... does serve as at least a
rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in
the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.' ,260
Some threads of truth underlie this idea, particularly where the injury is substantial. But the injury requirement, if narrowly applied only
to tangible injuries, is indeed only a "rough attempt" at assuring vigorous and responsible advocacy. This is demonstrated by simply looking at
some of the more insubstantial tangible injuries that have given rise to
standing. In United States v. SCRAP 2 6 1 the Court approvingly quoted
Professor Davis' observation that "an identifiable trifle is enough for
standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for
standing and the principle supplies the motivation. 2 6 2 However, this
258. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
259. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (citation omitted). See also Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article II1: Perspectiveson the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV L. REV.
297 (1979). But cf.K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 24:2. Professor Davis, who advocates strongly
that injury in fact should be the beginning and end of the standing analysis, believes that the
notion that injury somehow provides the motivation to litigate vigorously is an "idea [that]
deserves a quiet burial." Davis, supra note 4, at 470.
260. 474 U.S. at 473 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727. 740 (1972)). See also
Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 172-73 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106
(1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
261. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
262. Id. at 689 n. 14, (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
601, 613 (1968)). The Court reviewed the minor nature of the injuries that have been sufficient
for standing by observing that "important interests ... [have been] vindicated by plaintiffs
with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 [1962]); a five dollar fine and costs, (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 [1961]); and a $1.50 poll tax, (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
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need not be so if the thesis of this article is correct. It is only an injury
requirement that fails to take seriously the real if intangible public value
interests affected when constitutional rights are violated, that is doomed
263
to test only "trifles.
According to a second theory of the purpose of the injury requirement, injury is said to be tied to our notion of what constitutes a "case"
or "controversy". 2 4 Because Article III limits federal courts to "cases,"
and "cases" are supposed to involve two or more adverse parties, at least
one of whom has suffered or is threatened with personal injury by the
other, the injury requirement assures that the courts will not exceed the
"judicial power" set forth in Article III. Thus, injury serves a separation
of powers function. Injury tests whether there is a "case" or "controversy" and, in so doing, operates to "limit the federal judicial power 'to
those disputes ... which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.' "265 As Professor Berger has pointed
out, there can be no proper historical basis for this reading of Article
111.266 Moreover, there are logical limits to how the separation of powers
idea can inform standing determinations. Separation of powers principles only get the Court to the point that injury in fact, causation, and
redressability are required; they do not help to apply these requirements
or, more specifically, to differentiate among different claims of injury. It

may be that, even given injury, other doctrines expressive of separation of
powers principles may militate against a decision on the merits or against
[1966])." Id. But see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 ("[S]tanding is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy."); Reservists, 418 U.S. at 225-26
("the essence of standing 'is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite...
interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured '") (quoting Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 429, 435 (1952)).
263. See supra note 213 (discussing the mixture of tangible and intangible injuries involved
in a Fourth Amendment case). See also supra note 166 and accompanying text.
264. See Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 42-47 (1961). See also Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 563 (1962); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (under the historic understanding
of Article III, "[j]udicial power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional
concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of
lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies' ").
265. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Elast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
266. See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78
YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
Marshalling an impressive array of historical material, Professor Berger concludes that
"[t]here may well be policy arguments in favor of a 'personal interest' limitation on standing,
but they cannot rest on historically-derived constitutional compulsions." Id. at 840. There is
support in the cases and the commentary, however, for a modified version of this proposition,
although it is not necessarily stated in historical terms. See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315,
3324-25 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 97; K. DAVIS, supra
note 9, § 24.7, at 231.
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the grant of some particular relief requested. But if this is so in a particular case, it is nonsensical to say that-because standing requirements are
applied "in light of" separation of powers principles-what first appeared to be an injury caused by the defendant's conduct and redressable
by the court is in fact not injury at all.2 67
Whatever the reasons for requiring injury and whatever the rules for
determining whether it exists in particular cases, the Court, if it is serious
about the injury requirement, must decide injury questions by reference
only to harm suffered by the litigant. The Court should keep in mind
that although injury adjudication is important, it does not comprise the
whole of standing law, nor of justiciability, nor of federal court jurisdiction. There is more than adequate opportunity-in application of prudential standing bar, justiciability requirements, the political question
doctrine, and federalism restraints-to pretermit adjudication on the
merits should overriding policies expressed in other doctrines dictate that
result. In approaching the question of injury, however, the Court should
be solely concerned with that issue and nothing more.
Although getting the Court to stick to injury qua injury is difficult
enough, requiring a reasoned adjudication process for injury to public
value interests is even more difficult. The problem lies first in the Court's
failure to clearly perceive the true nature of post-Camp injury in fact and
second in the difficulty judges and lawyers have articulating and working
with the reasons that must be advanced for finding or rejecting a postCamp claim of injury.
I believe the problem lies in the Court's inability to comprehend
fully the ramifications of its holding in Camp, which cast injury loose
from its familiar though perhaps faulty moorings. Before Camp, legal
injury occurred when there was an invasion of an interest secured by
statute, the Constitution, or the common law (or by analogy to the common law when the government was the respondent).2 68 Camp abolished
these relatively well-defined legal injury sources and substituted "injury
in fact." The legal interest test has essentially returned for rights created
by statute, 269 but we are left in all other areas without familiar source
material for interests. The command of Camp and later cases is injury in
fact, but except for the added requirements that the injury be "concrete, ' 27 ° "distinct and palpable,"'2 71 and not "generalized" 272 or "too
267. See Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 9, at 642-49.
268. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 44-72 and accompanying text.

270. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177; Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740 n.16.
271. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
272. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176.
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abstract,"2 7 the Court has told us little about how we can recognize such

injury.
The Camp changeover from legal injury to injury in fact created an
essential contradiction. Legal injury was rejected because it forced the
court into a premature value judging role about legal types of injury.27 4
Uncomfortable with making premature legal value judgments, the Court
in Camp indicated that beyond showing that the litigant simply lost
something of value, the "legal type" of loss was irrelevant.2 7 The litigant had a sufficient stake in the litigation if he could show that the allegedly illegal actions caused loss and that the loss would be redressed if he
prevailed. 276 By abolishing legal injury, the Court believed that it could
avoid value judgments. Injury in fact, which everyone could recognize
without resort to archaic common law distinctions or complicated legislative history, was to be the rule. Injury was to be "popularized". To the
extent that the basis for standing is the litigant's, and not the lawyer's,
"stake" in the outcome of the litigation, it makes some sense to require
"layperson's" rather than "lawyer's" injury.
The contradiction in the Camp changeover is that the Court, far
from avoiding the process of judging values, has simply exchanged one
set of values for another. In so doing, the Court has increased the difficulty and uncertainty in ascertaining injury. The old set of values, for all
its failings, was relatively easy to discover and apply; the new set is not.
Lawyers are comfortable with consulting cases and statutes to marshal
an argument that the interest in the money lost is really more like a
franchise interest than a competitor interest, or even an argument that
recent cases and statutory changes show that this sort of competitor interest is now protected by law. How do lawyers argue and how do judges
determine that an interest asserted by a litigant represents a "trait or
motive of behavior widely enough shared" that invasion of it "can be cast
in terms of public values"? How do lawyers argue or do judges determine that society as a whole has "sympathy for and understanding of' a
273. Reservists, 418 U.S. at 227.
274. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153 ("The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits."). For example,
before Camp, if a litigant sued claiming he was losing money, that loss in and of itself was not
sufficient injury unless it was further determined that the type of financial interest involved was
protected from loss by some provision of law. Thus, loss of money because of "mere competition" was not injury because no provision of the law protected against fair competition, see
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 138 (1939), discussed supra note 25; yet loss
of money because of the loss of a franchise was injury because franchises were "rights" to
financial advantage secured by statute and the common law. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n,
278 U.S. 515, 519-20 (1929), discussed supra note 25.
275. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153-54.
276. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

112

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 13:57

litigant's loss? How is an "abstract" injury to be distinguished from a
"concrete" injury, and a "palpable" injury from an "unpalpable" one?277
One can easily ask difficult questions about the precise source of the
values underlying the interests. For example, why does exposure to "unwelcome religious exercises" in the public schools constitute harm?27 8
Why are persons denied equal treatment "stigmatized," and why is such
a stigma considered harm?2 79 Why do voters have a "plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes?" 2 8
Why is the "absolute" right to procedural due process so "importan[t] to
organized society?" 281 On the negative side, why is there no injury suffered when one requests and is denied information about government operations?2 82 Without attempting an analytical answer to any of these
questions, we may feel intuitively that the answers are "they just are" or
"they just aren't." To the extent that we do, and we reflect society's
values, the Court's conclusions are "correct." However, guidance for the
future is lacking.
Just as there is a danger that a court will "peek ahead" past the issue
of injury qua injury to the relative attractiveness of the merits of the case
or other considerations and allow that glimpse to color the injury determination, injury adjudication may also reflect nothing more than a given
judge's or justice's ad hoc personal notion of harm. The Court in many
cases appears to use its own collective intuition, yet all the while fails to
acknowledge that it is using intuition at all. Without necessarily denigrating the role of personal intuition as a starting point for analysis, both
the purposes of the injury requirement and the nature of public value
adjudication demand that an injury determination reflect society's values
and not those of individual judges or justices.
Common law public value adjudication, as with all other species of
common law adjudication that inquire into the "fundamental principles
277. Professor Vining points out the difficulty:
How an aspiration [i.e., a private value] becomes a shared [public] value in a
culture and what leads a court to absorb it into the intellectual machinery through
which the daily exercise of social force is judged and redirected are urgent subjects of
study. There are clearly intermediate stages where we are uncertain where our sympathies lie. We may be convinced of the importance of an asserted xalue but realize
that the courts would want more formal and developed proof that the value was
indeed shared in the culture before disposing of social force in its vindication. We
know very little of the process, and, knowing little, are subject to it rather than masters of it.
J. VINING, supra note 6, at 62.

278.
279.
280.
281.

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22.
Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3327; Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 208.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 266.

282. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177.
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of our society" ' 3 to discover legal principles, "is based not upon transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of society ascertained as
best it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed by the
best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment."8 4 The process,
however, is different from "I know it when I see it." '85 Part of the "discipline for the task" of common law public value injury adjudication is
that the Court, in deciding whether an interest is a public value and
whether the litigant is personally injured with respect to that interest,
must conduct those inquiries solely as a matter of determining whether
the litigant is harmed, and, to the greatest extent possible, by reference to
what it perceives to be the shared sense of society and not simply its own
personal values.
The problems discussed here with respect to the discovery and application of public values corresponding to constitutional provisions raise
broader questions about the legitimacy of the whole process of common
law public value injury adjudication. Even if the Court limits itself to the
issue of injury and conscientiously tries to reflect society's values with
respect to personal harm, it is proper to ask whether this is an appropriate role for the courts to play.
Two basic criticisms of the process are that courts are not particularly well equipped to say what society values are and that these determinations are properly left to the legislature. It is perhaps enough of an
answer to these objections to say that so long as injury in fact is a requirement of standing, judgment about the existence and force of public values
is unavoidable, and so long as injury in fact remains an Article III requirement, it will fall upon the courts to define what injury is. But to say
that public value adjudications are unavoidable does not mean that they
should be unconscious. Making the public value adjudication process a
conscious one may automatically improve the quality of the process and
the competence of the courts to make such judgments.
The alleged improper nature of this sort of inquiry or inability of
federal courts to meet the task, however, has not prevented them from
doing similar things in other areas. In at least three areas the federal
courts develop rules without the immediate guide of textual sources and
reflect public values in giving content to those rules. First, even after
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, z86 areas of federal common law re283. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128 (1959).
284. Id. The task in Bartkus was determining what due process meant for state criminal
procedure by distilling what was "implicit in the concept of liberty" as then required by Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
285. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
286. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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main.287 In choosing what legal principles to apply in those areas, the
federal courts "draw upon relevant standards of conduct available in
their communities,"2'8 8 and develop rules "in the light of reason and experience"28' 9 ina manner that "accords with 'common sense and the public weal.' "290 Second, there is evidence that the Court engages in

"constitutional common law" adjudication by promulgating "subconsti-

tutional rules" that operate to enforce the principles behind both textbased and important unwritten constitutional commands. 29 1 Areas of
such "constitutionally inspired common law" include measures that are
deemed necessary to enforce, but are not compelled by, the criminal procedural protection of the Bill of Rights (e.g., Miranda warnings, the exclusionary rule) and rules designed to enforce the free trade policies
behind the "dormant" Commerce Clause.29 2 Third, in giving content to
open-ended constitutional provisions in areas such as substantive due
process and equal protection, the Court's task has been described as one
by which it discovers and applies "conventional morality. ' 2 93 This form
of constitutional adjudication has been widely recognized by commenta-

tors as much closer to common law lawmaking than textual
interpretation.2 94
Common law injury adjudication parallels the processes exemplified
by these three activities. As with the traditional common law, the
Court's task is to draw "inspiration from every fountain of justice,"29' 5
legal and nonlegal, to discover and reflect commonly shared understandings and behavioral assumptions that are well-enough established that
287. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) ("[A]bsent some
congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law
exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases." (footnotes omitted)).
288. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 349 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
289. FED. R. EviD. 501.

290. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 315 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195
(1978)). This may include a variety of sources including nonlegal ones. Funk v. United States,
290 U.S. 377, 383 (1933); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884) ("the characteristic
principle of the common law [is] to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice").
291. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Forward:ConstitutionalCommon Law,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975).

292. Id. at 2.
293. Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The EssentialContradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1068-73 (1981), and sources cited therein.
294. See, e.g., Merrill, The Common Law Powers of FederalCourts. 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
10 (1985) and sources cited therein. Professor Merrill formally counts fundamental rights adjudication as a species of federal common law.
295. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
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legal content can be given to them.2 96 Similar to both the traditional
common law and "constitutional common law," common law public
value injury adjudication is an area where practical rules based on reason
and experience and relying heavily on "legislative facts" are the order of
the day.2 97 Perhaps because of this fact, the Court has recognized that
injury rules may be changed by Congress, which is in an equal if not
better position to sift and weigh such data.298 In common with "fundamental rights" adjudication, common law public value injury adjudication engages in a process similar to discovering and applying
"conventional morality," defined by one commentator as "'standards of
conduct... which are widely shared in... society.' ,"299 The parallel is
even greater when the Court ascertains public value interests corresponding to unwritten constitutional guarantees, since many of the same considerations that determine whether an interest is so fundamental that it
has constitutional right status are involved in determining whether the
interest is a public value for injury purposes.3 °0
Not surprisingly, separation of power and institutional competence
objections similar to those suggested here have been leveled at the three
parallel areas of common law adjudication mentioned above. What little
criticism there is of the power of federal courts to make federal common
law is based upon the notion that Congress, not the courts, should be the
primary policy-making branch except as it delegates that power to the
judiciary.3 0 1 There has, of course, been pointed criticism of the Court's
296. See generally 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 10 (1967) ("Customs, such as those embodied in common law, are such practices and usages as exist, not just in memory, but actively, in
guidance of, or at least in influence upon, the people's current pursuits.") and 15A AM. JUR.
2D Common Law § 1 (1976) (common law is "the embodiment of broad and comprehensive
unwritten principles, inspired by natural reason and an innate sense of justice, and adopted by
common consent for the regulation and government of the affairs of men").
297. See Monaghan, supra note 291, at 35 (constitutional common law rules are designed
to "effectuate policies found in the text and structure of the Constitution"); id. at 26 (constitutional common law rules "may reflect a blend of reason, analogy, experience, and pure
hunch").
298. See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text. See also New Jersey v. New York, 283
U.S. 336, 348 (1931) (federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Congress"). But see Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 240 (1973) (arguing that legislative-type facts are
equally available to courts in the form of expert testimony).
299. Wellington, supra note 298, at 244 (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
165 (1961)). See J. VINING, supra note 6, at 61 (a public value is an interest that is "a trait and
motive of behavior widely enough shared to permit us to recognize it as a social role").
300. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (relying on the historical, moral, and
social materials used to support the finding that a woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy is within the concept of liberty secured by the Due Process Clause).
301. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 312-13. ("The enactment of a federal rule is
an area of national concern ... is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully
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"constitutional common law" adjudication establishing "subconstitutional" rules302 and discovering and applying fundamental rights.3 03
Rarely is the Court's power to develop some federal common law or to

give some content to constitutional provisions doubted. Rather, the criticism revolves around issues of overstepping, thereby invading the legislative province, or exceeding the institutional competence of courts. 3 4
The force of these objections as applied to common law public value
injury adjudication is blunted somewhat by three factors. First, Congress has input into the process, indirectly when trends in legislative policy color or reflect social values, 30 5 and directly when Congress modifies
injury by enacting new "legal rights, the invasion of which creates stand-

ing.", 3 6 Thus, unlike fundamental rights adjudication, but somewhat

similar to the general common law and constitutional common law, there
is a dialogue with Congress.30 7 Second, standing is a preliminary determination rather than a ruling on the merits; thus, unlike fundamental
rights adjudication and to a lesser extent the imposition of subconstitutional rules, the consequences of a "mistaken" public value determination for standing purposes is not as great. Thus, the age-old problem of
fundamental rights adjudication, succinctly captured by Professor

Michelman's question "why education and not golf?", loses its force
when applied to injury adjudication because the answer there is probably
"both. ' 30 8 Third, the source of power to define injury-Article III-is
insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their elected representatives."); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981).
302. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, Reconsideringthe ConstitutionalCommon Law, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1117 (1978).
303. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63-

67 (1980); Brest, supra note 293, at 1080-83.
304. See ELY, supra note 303, at 4-5, 67; Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1971) (fundamental rights adjudication); Shrock & Welsh,
supra note 302, at 1126-45, 1149-53 (subconstitutional rules).
305. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
307. See Monaghan, supra note 291, at 26-30, 34-38. Congress' input may be of the "oneway ratchet" type. Though Congress can expand beyond the common law public value notion
of injury, it would be hard-pressed to pass legislation which "overruled" a court determination
that injury existed on particular facts. Cf Miller, ConstitutionalRemedies for Underinclusive
Statutes: A CriticalAppraisalof Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 132-37
(1985). However, separation of powers or federalism interests could be vindicated in other
ways by statutes limiting jurisdiction, repealing statutes establishing causes of action, or by
limiting relief that may be granted. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1983) (anti-injunction statute).
308. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting the Poor
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 59 (1969); See Sierra Club, 405 U.S.
at 738 (quoting Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970): "The interest alleged to have been injured 'may reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational"as well as
economic values' ") (emphasis added).
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the peculiar province of courts. Courts must live with the consequences
of an injury determination. Defenses on the merits or other doctrines
may well preclude a final ruling that affects other branches, but the immediate effect of a positive standing determination is that, barring other
jurisdictional limitations, the court must try or otherwise dispose of the
case. In addition, however the institutional competence of courts is defined, determinations of the meaning of "injury," of what a "case" or
"controversy" is, and of the behavior and status of litigants, are subjects
about which judges can claim expertise. Consequently, there is somewhat less chance that injury adjudication will exceed the institutional
competence of the courts.
At least in the context of discovery and application of public value
interests corresponding to constitutional guarantees, institutional competence objections have even less validity since, relative to other public officers, federal judges are generally knowledgeable of the historical and
social contexts of law, particularly constitutional law. Consequently, the
danger of judges being isolated from normal society in life-tenured positions and unknowingly infusing outmoded concepts of harm into the injury adjudication process is not as great. 30 9 However, there is the
problem-which infects all species of adjudication but has a special history with respect to standing-that judges will take advantage of the
"malleability of interest and injury"3 1 to find or decline to find public
value interests for reasons unrelated to whether there is injury or standing. Although the analysis and suggestions contained in this Article may
help to understand and structure the inquiry, this Article cannot offer a
satisfactory solution to the problems of hidden agendas and intellectual
dishonesty that have pervaded the standing decisions.
Conclusion
Despite the Court's statement that there can be no standing when
the only injury alleged is violation of a "personal constitutional right," it
has nonetheless decided a number of cases in which that appears to have
been the only injury involved. The reason for this apparently inconsistent behavior has been obscure, but recent cases suggest a rationale
which is consistent with current standing doctrine and which has the
309. See L. TRIBE, supra note 168, at 454:
Part of what was wrong with Lochner was the Court's overconfidence, both in its
own factual notions about working conditions and perhaps also in its own normative
convictions about the meaning of liberty; at least by the 1920's, if not yet in 1905, the
Court should probably have paid more heed to the mounting agreement, if not the
consensus, that the economic 'freedom' it was protecting was more myth than reality.
310. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER, supra note 1, at § 3335.1, at 423.
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potential for application to a wide variety of constitutional injuries. Rejection of the personal constitutional right approach to injury forecloses
only one of the two possible routes, the legal interest model of injury.
The other model of injury analysis-common law public value adjudication-remains available. Analysis of the cases alleging violations of constitutional rights in which standing has been allowed, even though no
traditionally cognizable injury can be shown, indicates that the Court has
approved of the common law public value adjudication process and has
applied it to find injury to societal interests corresponding to core constitutional principles. This development should allow for standing in many
constitutional cases in which it has been widely assumed that no cognizable injury existed.

